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WEINGARTEN, IRA MARC. Generating A Theoretical Base For 
Restructuring Curriculum Content.(1979) 
Directed by: Dr. David E. Purpel. Pp. 150. 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to an 
ongoing effort among a number of contemporary curriculum 
theorists to generate a theoretical base for restruc­
turing' curriculum content. The study is divided into a 
Prologue, two Chapters, and an Epilogue. 
PROLOGUE confronts the significant metatheoretical 
cal problems that are are raised simply by the articulation 
of this project. In the course of asking "What kind of 
research strategies, consonant with this intention, are 
appropriate for educators in North America?" the study 
reviews the metatheoretical considerations that have 
led contemporary curriculum theorists to frame such a 
question. Two avenues of approach that have emerged 
from such considerations are identified~~a personal 
change position that involves a restructuring of 
individual consciousness, and a social change position 
that is oriented towards a restructuring of the 
ensemble of social relationships. The potentials of 
these two strategies are explored, and an argument 
is made for the development of a way of speaking and 
acting that honors the significance of both. 
Chapter I, LIBERAL DOCTRINE AS CURRICULUM CONTENT, 
begins by presenting the taken-for-granted conception 
of curriculum content-as-response to the question 
"What do we teach in schools?", and the liberal doctrine 
as integrating the psychological and political avenues 
of reflection that have been employed to affect that 
response. The epistemological categories of liberal 
psychological theory are played off against the human 
predicament they disclose in the course of establishing 
a concrete relationship between liberal psychological 
theory and the problematic quality of individual existence 
in our time. In addition, the epistemological cate­
gories of liberal political theory are played off 
against the human predicament they disclose in the 
course of establishing a concrete relationship between 
liberal political theory and the problematic quality of 
social existence in our time. Thus, the two avenues of 
reflection are seen as signalling a particular world 
that we come up against in life (particularly life-in-
schools): "liberal doctrine as curriculum content." 
It is argued that liberal doctrine as curriculum content 
presents us with a fundamentally interpersonal world 
which, in turn, leads us to construct environments that 
limit access to inner spaces, masks the impact of 
institutional communications and diverts the potential­
ities of collective effort. 
In Chapter II, IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM 
THEORIZING, the researcher turns his attention 'to the 
vast majority of curricularists for whom such inquiry 
might seem foreign or remote. Section one, The 
Institution of Education as the Methodology of Liberal 
Doctrine: A Perspective on the Curriculum Theorists Situa­
tion, draws upon the frame of reference introduced in 
Chapter I to develop fresh approaches to many of the topics 
contemporary curricularists are concerned about. Two 
interlocking predicaments, "making hay" (a contradiction 
between our intention and practice that leads us to do more) 
and "searching for the paddle," (an inability to establish 
a cause-effect relation between educational theory and 
school practice that leads us to do less) portray the 
difficulties that contemporary curricularists face. An 
analogy between the hypothetical-deductive model of 
inquiry and the bureaucratic structure of the Institution 
of Education is constructed. An interpretation of "the 
reading experience" and "the back to basics" sentiment is 
offered. These heuristics, in turn, are drawn upon to 
respond to the twin questions "Why curriculum theorizing?" 
and "Why is it so difficult"? In effect, if the problems 
educators face are not transparent, if "we understand that 
we misunderstand," curriculum theorizing is both diffi­
cult and necessary. We must pursue it if we are to 
develop the insight and communicative competence to 
challenge the institutional life-form, and overcome the 
predicaments of "making hay" and "searching for the paddle." 
Section two of this chapter undertakes a textual 
analysis of two traditional avenues of approach to 
curriculum theorizing. This discussion of the work of the 
Herbartians and Paul Hirst documents the inability of 
inquiry that starts from the taken-for-granted 
conceptualization of curriculum content to shed light upon 
either the biographical or socio-political limit situa­
tions of everyday life—not even in schools. 
Finally, a brief Epilogue reviews the contributions 
of this study' and speculates upon the future directions 
such efforts may take. 
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1 
PROLOGUE 
My hope for this study is that it can make a con­
tribution to an ongoing effort among a number of 
curriculum theorists to generate a theoretical base for 
restructuring curriculum content."'" I have chosen to 
focus upon liberal doctrine because it exists as both an 
ideology that pervades the institutional life of America 
(especially schools), and as a substantial limit 
situation that we encounter in our day-to-day lives, and 
sometimes transcend. This focus permits me, in Chapter I, 
to review curriculum content in terms of this complex 
codification in which it is embedded. In Chapter II, I 
turn my attention to the vast majority of curricularists 
for whom such inquiry might be regarded as foreign and 
remote, as I attempt to sketch the implications of my 
review for the field. 
The Prologue is divided into two sections. In section 
one, I locate the metatheoretical concerns that prompted 
me to undertake this study in terms of the methodological 
context of related theoretical efforts in curriculum. 
This section begins with the metatheoretical overview 
provided by Richard Bernstein in his book The Restructuring 
2 of Social and Political Theory. While Bernstein is not 
2 
a curricularist, his work is a valuable point of departure 
for describing and interpreting these complex and pro­
foundly significant efforts. In section two, I focus 
directly upon the methodology to be employed in this 
study, in terms of the dilemmas I faced in its prepara­
tion, and how I attempted to respond to these dilemmas. 
As well, I comment upon each section of the study, in 
the course of providing a step-by-step summary. 
Metatheoretical Concerns 
Bernstein's Overview 
Richard Bernstein brings a very special maturity to 
the task of building an argument (in both the older 
sense of a plot or story, and the conventional sense of 
a rational argument) for The Restructuring of Social and 
Political Theory. He envisions: 
...a dialectical movement from the advocacy of 
empirical theory to the realization of the 
necessity for interpretation and understanding 
of social and political reali-ty. And finally, 
there is growing recognition of the need for a 
type of critique that has a practical interest 
in the fate and quality of social and political 
life. The search for empirical correlations, 
the task of interpreting social and political 
reality, and the critique of this "reality" 
are not three distinct types of inquiry. They 
are three internal moments of theorizing 
about social and political life.3 
While I do not believe that Bernstein achieves a 
"Hegalian embrace" of the multifaceted voices of 
mainstream social scientists, language analysts, 
3 
descriptive and constitutive phenomonologists, and critical 
theorists, his attempt is most significant because it 
assumes a very fundamental insight. In the late 1970's, 
what shall count as legitimate inquiry in the social and 
human studies is very much "up for grabs". Bernstein's 
problem is no longer the polemical one of shattering 
a false metatheoretical consensus. Rather, he begins 
by "recovering and articulating the understanding that 
4 mainstream social scientists have of their discipline", 
and proceeds to work through volumes of seemingly 
diverse and unrelated critiques "attempting to assess 
their strengths and weakness and to sort out what is 
5 right and wrong". 
The review of Merton, Smelsor, Romans, Almond, 
Truman, Rudner and Nagle locates a set of framework 
assumptions and catagorical distiiictions that Bernstein 
calls "Mainstream Social Science", without reducing 
this project to a caricature. Nevertheless, he 
demonstrates that mainstream social science has failed 
to redeem its promise to provide meaningful theoreti­
cal explanations of human behavior that take a 
deductive form and can be verified by reference to 
counter-factual explanations of objectively established 
correlations between independent and dependent 
variables. 1-Ie patiently explains how this naturalistic 
interpretation of human behavior misrepresents 
4 
the ways in which we describe, explain and understand 
human action, effectively freezes out the possibility of 
normative theory, and is very much wedded to the social 
and political reality it is attempting to study. At the 
same time, a variety of "impossibility arguments" are 
examined and found inconclusive; Bernstein.sees no 
reason to conclude that the idea of a social science is 
7 ultimately impossible. Rather, the issue is moral, 
psychological, and finally political. 
In this connection, striking parallels between the 
g 
work of analytical philosophers such as Louch and 
9 Ryan, and descriptive phenomenologists such as Schutz 
are explored."^ While purely descriptive studies of 
practice, forms of life and intersubjective meaning 
are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and they enable 
us to see the interpretative schemes that underlie and 
are presupposed by mainstream social science, they do 
not succeed in isolating the problems of interpreta­
tion from those involved in causation. In effect, 
"what we judge to be an adequate interpretation of 
social action is itself dependent upon our under­
standing of the causal determinants of social action"."^""'" 
Moreover, these considerations bring into sharp relief 
a problematic conception of the role of the theorist 
that has its origin in Weber, but is shared by main­
5 
stream empiricists, language analysts, and even the more 
descriptive phenomenologists. The idea that the 
theorist can and should adopt an attitude that is 
disinterested, objective and aloof is powerfully 
challenged. Even a model which simply reflects the 
commonsense interpretations of everyday life does not 
allow us to question whether there are distortions or 
mystifications in persons' self-understanding, and it 
allows us to mistake what might be relative to a 
specific historical context for a permanent feature of 
12 the human condition. 
It is the European traditions of phenomenology and 
critical theory that have anticipated, and attempted to 
respond to this challenge. Bernstein contrasts the 
approach outlined by Husserl in the Crises of the 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 
with the more recent efforts of I-Iabermas to develop a 
social theory of knowledge which includes technical, 
practical, and emancipatory interests, and a theory of 
communicative competence that would clarify the 
episternological status of critical theory. 
He sees Husserl as attempting to recover and fulfill 
the guiding ideal of Theoria. The act of theorizing, 
properly understood, involves a "conversion" that 
"frees" the theorist from the layers of myth in which 
his life is imbedded. In Husserl's self-understanding: 
6 
...This means not only that man should be changed 
ethically (but that) the whole human surrounding 
world, the political and social existence must be 
fashioned anew...13 
In response, Bernstein comments: 
But while Husserl affirms the absolute self-
responsibility of man based on genuine 
theoretical insight and self-understanding, he 
never succeeds in showing us concretely the 
intrinsic connections between the life of pure 
Theoria and its practical efficacy in transforming 
mankind. 
In Bernstein's treatment, Habermas, on the other 
hand, is seen as attempting to recover and fulfill the 
guiding ideal of Praxis, where the pursuit of the good 
and just life becomes synonoinous with the study of 
politics. According to Bernstein, the theory of 
cognitive interests is intended to pave the way for such 
] 5 
a study. ' Habermas asserts that all knowledge is 
generated out of the dimensions of human social 
16 existence — work, interaction, and power. For 
example, work is considered a primary dimension of human 
social existence that refers to ways in which individuals 
o 
control and manipulate their environment in order to 
17 survive. It demands an essentially technical 
"knowledge constitutive interest" in control. Habermas1 
use of technical here refers to the Greek sense of 
Techne—the production of artifacts and the mastery of 
objectified tasks. As expressed in the empirical-
analytic sciences (and in disciplines that seek to copy 
7 
its style) the technical interest shapes and determines 
the categories we use to think about things; what we think 
18 about and what we consider valid ways of thinking. 
This is the sense in which we can say with I-Iabermas that 
scientism, the belief that the empirical analytic 
sciences are synonomous with knowledge, negates praxis. 
It aspires to provide a set of techniques for managing 
men that would make any discussion of how the good and 
just life is to be attained quite irrelevant. Habermas 
argues that already such discussion (which "takes place" 
in the dimension of human interaction, and gives birth 
to the historical/hermeneutical disciplines such as 
phenomenology which are guided by the practical interest 
in understanding) has become so distorted that it is 
19 increasingly irrelevant to the use of power. 
This, in turn, threatens theory itself, because, as 
Habermas understands, theoretical discourse is 
essentially an intersubjective linguistic process that 
requires a community of inquirers that are prepared to 
2 0  bracket the constraints of action; they must be able 
21 to pursue and follow the best argument. To the extent 
to which the technical interest becomes so pervasive 
that we can no longer determine, concretely, the ways 
in which social and political institutions distort that 
dialogue, the self-corrective inquiry that Pierce and 
Dewey put their faith in (and Habermas regards as a 
necessary starting point) cannot occur. 
8 
Thus, the need for critical theory guided by an-
emancipatory intention is seen as evident. Freud's 
psychoanalysis and Marx's critique of ideology have some 
usefulness as models, in the sense that both involve 
developing interpretations that are neither irrelevant to 
nor reducible to the common sense interpretations of 
persons struggling to liberate themselves from psychic 
2 2  or political enslavement. These analogies can be 
pushed too far; Habermas is well aware that Freud saw the 
therapeutic situation as a one-to-one relationship 
between two unequals, and that what is clear and specific 
in Marxism has been falsified by historical events. He 
is merely situating the guiding spirit of critical 
theory in the activity of an emancipatory self-reflection 
Bernstein finds serious problems with Habermas, too. 
But on the whole, he is sympathetic. He does not think 
that Habermas succeeds in justifying his claim that 
there are categorically distinct forms of knowledge and 
inquiry. For example, invoking the concept of "technical 
interest" does not solve the problem of developing 
principles to help mainstream scientists resolve con­
flicting self-interpretations of their work. And while 
hermeneutics represents a vital tradition in continental 
thought that might well operate (on the continent) in a 
"distinctive methodological framework", Bernstein 
faults Habermas for failing to specify this framework. ̂  
9 
In effect, Bernstein suggests that it would be better to 
see a continuity—and not a reduction in all forms of 
inquiry, especially between Hermeneutics and critical 
25 theory. Finally, he reminds us that there are still 
major questions beyond the scope of critical theory and 
hermeneutics: 
In a new form we have the old problem that has 
faced every critical theorist: under what conditions 
will persons that have a clear understanding of 
their historical circumstances be motivated to 
overcome distorted communication?.. What are the 
concrete dynamics of the process?^^ 
Cont.radist.inctions: Two Mappings of the Field of Curri­
culum Theorizing 
We find in Bernstein's overview the tools for 
grasping the fundamental issue that divides curriculum 
theorists who no longer claim to be "disinterested, 
objective and aloof", but are desparately searching for 
forms of inquiry and activity that honor an emancipatory 
commitment. Perhaps the sharpest way to pose the problem 
would be to contrast two mappings of the curriculum 
field. In their contradistinctions, the two mappings 
reflect a dissonance, and we will see that this 
dissonance calls attention to the metatheoretical 
concerns I bring to this investigation. At the same 
time, the two maps clarify what I take to be a common 
ground that indicates the distance that has already been 
traveled from the obtuse metatheoretical argumentation 
that has become standard in many of the established 
disciplines, towards the development of a distinctive 
style of inquiry and theoretical activity eventually 
capable of generating a theoretical base for restruc­
turing curriculum content. It is to this journey that 
the present study is dedicated. 
In the preface to a book of readings entitled 
Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, William 
Pinar presents a mapping of the field, which he 
extended and clarified in a presentation to AERA in 
1977. In the preface he writes: 
In general terms, this process of reconceptualiza-
tion has three stages. First, a tradition 
accumulates, and many initiates accept uncritically 
the values of that tradition. ...Essentially this 
work is of a technical sort; it is carrying the 
load of others. To surpass this tradition, the 
critic is required. His task is complicated and 
often thankless. It involves learning the 
language of the heritage, of the masters, in 
order to be understood. This learning nearly 
always occurs because the critic comes of age in 
the tradition; it is through his own usually 
painful self-education that he comes to realize 
the difficulties with accepted tradition. Only 
then does he begin to criticize in hope of 
rectifying the situation. While the criticism is 
consciously aimed at his colleagues, the real 
target lies within him, placed there by his early 
acculturation. So the effects of criticism are 
as discomforting to the critic as to those who 
are criticized. Yet this second stage is 
necessary for the third to begin. . .The final stage 
has just begun in the curriculum field. Some of 
us have begun to turn our attention from the past 
(the Tyler tradition and present-day social 
science) and begun to look to the present and to 
the future. This stage has meant introducing 
phenomenology and existentialism to the field, 
11 
in order to provide conceptual tools by which we can 
understand human experience of education... The 
intellectual foundations of continental philosophy 
and the experience of life in the United States 
(specifically in the schools) in this last third of 
the twentieth century are the two primary "ingredients" 
of the curriculum field reconceptualized.^7 
From Pinar's perspective, the political emphasis of the 
work of Apple, Mann, Burton, Molnar, and some of the work 
of Macdonald and Huebner, represents a critique of "the 
past", but is still somehow "absorbed" in it. These 
"critical reconceptualists" rightly insist that 
research is an inherently political act. Their 
situating of curriculum issues in the broad intellectual/ 
cultural/historical currents of 20th century life is 
applauded. When they write for "school people", as they 
did in Schools in Search of Meaning, their intention is 
not to guide curriculum development in the technical 
sense in which this is usually conceived, but to "raise 
consciousness", and this too Pinar sees as a decided 
virtue. The order of critique distinguishes it from the 
many reform efforts that accept the deep structure of 
education and social life, and thinks in terms of 
isolated problems and "great society" solutions; it 
aspires to critique which insists upon transformation of 
2 8 extant structures. 
All this is embraced, but seen as providing a bridge 
(albeit a necessary one) from a critique of the old to 
the creation of the new. It clears the way for the 
12 
"post-critical reconceptualists" (eg., Pinar, Schucat-
Shaw, Riorden, Grumet, some works of Macdonald, Greene 
and Huebner) who are directly concerned with finding 
their own voice, with transforming themselves and their 
work "from the static, the oppressive, the deformed, to 
the fluid free process that is historical and individual 
29 movement". In the language of phenomenology, 
existentialisn, and imaginative literature, they find 
ways to share the transformations they undergo, and their 
theorizing provides "signposts" for those who undertake 
the effort to liberate themselves from their enslavement 
and complicity with contemporary conditions. 
In contrast, let us look at the mapping James 
Macdonald outlined for the Curriculum Theory Conference 
30 at Charlottesville, Virginia in October of 197 5. The 
schema was only intended to be used for discussion 
purposes at the conference, but the discussion that it 
stimulated still continues, and we must see why this is 
so. 
Drawing upon I-Iabermas' framework, Macdonald found 
it useful to view the field "in terms of the intentions 
3J and interests of curriculum theorizers". ' He develops 
three categories that correspond to the three 
"knowledge constitutive interests" we discussed above--
control theorists, hermeneutical theorists and critical 
theorists. 
13 
The category of "control theory" refers to precisely the 
same body of curriculum literature as Pinar's categories 
of traditionalists and present-day social scientists 
(conceptual empiricists in his designation). Macdonald, 
as did Pinar, cites Tyler as the exemplar, and refers to 
the extension of the Tyler Rationale by Goodlad and 
Richter. Such theory is clearly intended to increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness of educational (almost 
always school) activity "by providing rational con­
ceptualizations of the relevant phenomenon from which 
purposive-rational (i.e., technical) actions may be 
32 generated". Both Pinar and Macdonald agree that the 
work of Frymier and Duncan exemplifies the so-called 
"scientific" approach to theory construction, which 
Macdonald also calls "control theory" in the sense that 
it involves identifying relevant phenomenon and 
operationalizing events in terms of cause-effect 
relationships. In effect, both mappings indicate a 
need to move beyond these kind of approaches. Macdonald 
c 
lists three general "critiques" of control theory in 
curriculum, which parallel the arguments we find in 
Bernsteins review of social and political theory: 
1. Control is only one human interest and is not 
appropriate when taken in the form of a type 
of rationality and methodology developed in 
the sciences in relation to non-human objects 
and applied to human beings. 
14 
2. Both scientific and technical control approaches 
mistake their efforts as being "value-free" and 
thus cover up a fundamental aspect of curriculum 
and instruction - the definition and selection 
of values translated into goals. 
3. The control theories are embedded in a social 
structure in which they can only operate to 
facilitate a status quo which may well reduce 
our understanding of the human condition and 
facilitate the restriction of human freedom and 
the development of human potential.33 
It is in reference to Macdonald's two other cate­
gories that we find a considerable disparity. Recall that 
in the Pinar schema, the work of the "critical recon-
ceptualists" clear the way for the ground-breaking efforts 
of the "post-critical reconceptualists". Here, the 
literature that Pinar called "post-critical", Macdonald 
calls "hermeneutical". The difference is more than 
semantic. In the Macdonald outline, the work of Pinar, 
Greene, Riorden, Klohr, as well as Hubner1s work with 
curriculum language is seen as representing intentional 
attempts to broaden our understanding of being human 
through "a constant creative search for conceptual 
o 
frameworks that will reveal through new interpretations 
a different perspective on the conditions we are con-
34 cerned about". This activity is praised for having 
"opened up" the field, and "laid to rest clearly for 
35 thoughtful people" the adequacy and integrity of 
control theory. But, in a magnificient metaphor we 
learn that, for Macdonald, it is the hermeneutical 
15 
theorists that provide the transition, and the critical 
theorists that break new ground. He likens hermeneutical 
scholarship to midwifery: 
...Curriculum theory... is not the midwife helping or 
bringing the child into the world, but the pregnant 
mother grunting and groaning, straining and praying 
during the issue of the child. Without the child 
and its eventual drawing of its first breath, it is 
not complete. 36 
Macdonald interprets the significance of hermeneutical 
theory in much the same terms as Pinar views the 
critical theorist, as "standing back", offering only 
"philosophical analysis or criticism". It "fails to 
integrate its theory with its praxis, either in the 
origination of its consciousness or in its programatic 
37 fulfillment". In critical theory, particularly the 
work of Apple and Mann, Macdonald finds a more signifi­
cant future direction, one that embodies a more "total 
perspective": 
A curriculum theory, as a critical theory would be 
predicated upon examining the basic propositions of 
curriculum as socially and historically located 
social conventions. It would examine in detail 
the constraints placed upon the curriculum by the 
forming of social relations, rewards, and learning 
expectations in curriculum by economic and 
occupational interest structures, social class 
and power structures; and the use of language as 
distorted by work and power arrangements, as well 
as the form of language itself.3 8 
The Issue, The Common Ground, and The Character of My 
Metatheoretical Concerns 
Having introduced these two mappings, I should like to 
move towards locating the fundamental issue that they 
16 
raise. From there I can go one to clarify the meta-
theoretical concerns I bring to this study. 
That Macdonald's challenge to the "hermeneutical 
theorists" to make explicit the emancipatory intent that 
undergrids their inquiry has been taken up by Pinar, 
Riorden, Schucat-Shaw, and Klohr (each in their own special 
39 way to be sure), suggests that the contradistinctions 
we find in the two mappings may not stem from categorically 
different intentions. The dialogue does not seem to 
question whether we should build a discipline in curricu­
lum that is solidly emancipatory in intent. Rather, it 
seems the question that remains unresolved is "What kind 
of research strategies, consonant with this intention, 
are appropriate for educators in North America?" 
Let me hasten to add that I do not mean to suggest 
either that an explicit consensus must be achieved by 
curriculum theorists as a prerequisite for generating 
a theoretical base for the restructuring of curriculum 
content, or that there is not already a discernable 
common ground that informs the consideration of the 
question. To articulate a common ground that is both 
tacit and abstract is risky at best. Nevertheless, our 
discussion thus far does provide us with the intellectual 
tools for sketching what I take to be a common ground, and 
this will help to locate the issue that remains salient. 
17 
Macdonald's critique of "hermeneutical theorists" and 
Bernstein's criticism of Husserl (for failing to show how 
the "conversion" that "frees" the theorist from the layers 
of myth in which his life is imbedded connects con­
cretely to the transformation of mankind) suggests that 
theorizing guided by an emancipatory intent, must have a 
"strategic element" to it. Strategic here refers to 
some conception of the relationship between theory and 
praxis. Bernstein's consideration of Habermas indicates 
that one clear meaning of praxis is associated with the 
Greek notion of the pursuit of the good and just life. 
Such a pursuit proceeds pedagogically. Habermas insists 
that only the power of self-reflection can free human 
consciousness from dependence upon reified structures. 
From my understanding of the work of Pinar, Riorden, 
Shucat-Shaw, and Klohr, I feel confident that there is 
no disagreement here. What I am suggesting as a 
common ground is that a consonant strategy involves, 
minimally, a reflection that aims at authentic "emanci­
pating" insights which in turn are directed towards, or 
have some utility for initiating, analagous processes of 
reflection among persons or groups of persons. 
Thus, I am also suggesting that the issue which 
remains salient has a strategic quality to it. It has 
something to do with two markedly different senses of 
what Bernstein called "the concrete dynamics of the 
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40 ...(emancipatory)... process". As he noted, Germanic 
scholarship does not specify these dynamics. And of 
course, to specify them would be to render the process 
technical, and negate the emancipatory potential. On the 
other hand, the significance of a particular act of 
theorizing, indeed what makes it curriculum theory and not 
Germanic scholarship, has to do with the "practical 
wisdom" the theorist brings to bear upon his/her 
reflection at its inception. In effect, the theorist must 
leave the safety and shelter of Germanic texts and meta-
critique if she/he is to do curriculum theory, but now 
the issues that are raised are no longer scholastic, and 
the map that was stashed for safekeeping in the pro­
verbial back pocket just does not solve the problem of 
which way to turn (although the map remains indispen-
ible for curriculum theorists to see clearly their own 
and their colleagues1 work in the context of the growth 
of knowledge in general) . 
Is the first step on the road to emancipation 
personal, and does it involve coming to terms with the 
ways in which the concrete biographical structure is 
arrested, or is the first step socio-political, and one 
which involves coming to terms with the basic ways in 
which institutions are organized and controlled? By 
theoretical base do we mean, as Michael Apple does, 
"the necessary preconditions for a politically and 
41 educationally potent program of analysis" or do we mean, 
as William Pinar does, "an attempt to formulate in 
general terms the broad outline of past, present and 
future, the nature of our experience, and specially our 
educational experience, that is the way we can under­
stand our present in the way that allows us to move on, 
4? more learned, more evolved than before"? 
This, I submit, is the outstanding issue, and it has 
some very definite methodological consequences. I 
would like to indicate here what I take some of these 
consequences to be. The purpose is to share with you 
the metatheoretical concerns I bring to this study. 
In so doing, I do not mean to suggest that 
curriculum theorists have been blind to the relation­
ship between biographic and socio-political movement. 
Quite the contrary, despite the often heated contro­
versy that has permeated the atmosphere of virtually 
every recent gathering of curriculum theorists, I 
would like to believe that few would want to argue with 
Macdonald when he said in June of '76: 
I do not believe that there is any fundamental 
contradiction in the long run between those 
theorists who advocate a personal change position 
and those who advocate a social change 
orientation in terms of changing consciousness 
towards a liberating praxis. This assumes that 
the social approach does involve a highly 
structured set of "new" meanings, nor the 
personal growth approach being structured to a 
highly individualistic orientation without meaning 
for communal living. Neither approach need be 
exaggerated to the point of exclusion of the 
other.4 3 
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However, "the long run" has just begun, and the problem 
of speaking simultaneously to the two poles of our 
concern remains. 
For example, Apple would have us begin our theoreti­
cal reflection by positing a conceptual whole, which he 
calls Hegemony: 
(Hegemony) is a whole body of practices and 
expectations; our assignments of energy, our 
ordinary understanding of man and his world. It 
is a set of meanings and values which as they are 
experienced as practices appear as reciprocally 
confirming... 
"Analyzing Hegemony" proceeds by "situating" the school 
as an institution, the knowledge forms, and the educator 
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him or herself as constitutive parts of this whole. 
Such a research program has undeniable value for 
educators who are concerned with generating a theoreti­
cal base for restructuring curriculum content. The 
scope of phenomenon it can potentially comprehend is 
enormous. Surely one criterion for an adequate 
theoretical base must be its scope. Without an adequate 
appreciation of the scope of the project, efforts to 
restructure curriculum content run the decided risk of 
becoming exercises in self-delusion. And this research 
strategy presupposes that any effort to restructure 
curriculum content can be authentic only in so far as 
it is total, embracing all aspects of society and all 
dimensions of human existence. 
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Here we locate not only a strength, but also a 
definite weakness. The kind of totality it requires 
people to conceive is hopelessly abstract and literally 
all-encompassing. This makes it extremely difficult to 
separate the light from the darkness. The concept 
"hegemony" has no substantial, emotive, viscerally 
compelling character to it. While it may well be a 
concept that can name the whole we live through, it 
requires us in the Apple formulation to disassociate 
ourselves from this lived experience in order to make it 
intelligible and politically potent. Moreover, the 
concept hegemony was not built from the language forms 
that Americans live through in their everyday lives, but 
superimposes a foreign, and I fear, a very distant 
vocabulary, although surely a more conceptually adequate 
one. I am very much concerned about the potential of 
this new vocabulary to resonate with people's own mean­
ing structures. Suppose we succeed in situating people 
in this abstraction, training their analytic capabilities 
to unpack the dense web of political, economic, and 
social relations of which it is composed, and to chart 
these relationships in an intellectually responsible way. 
Surely we would develop a new tradition of sophisticated 
and important scholarship, and I do not wish to demean 
this possibility. But I wonder what these people would 
find in their own lives, and in the world they have 
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turned into a monstrous abstraction, to affirm, and yes, 
to love. How successful would they be in "initiating 
analogous processes of self-reflection", in entering into 
other peoples' lives, if the insights they brought with 
them took on such a foreign structure? How would one 
say, in this new vocabulary, "I love the world, just 
the way it is, and this is why I want to change it"? 
Would one forget? 
Pinar, on the other hand, might have us begin by: 
Likening ourselves to the situation of campers, 
sitting around a campfire at night. What is close 
at hand is reasonably illuminated, though the 
light by which we see flickers, altering con­
tinually our perceptions. We look outwards, 
attempting to see the broadei: contexts in which 
we sit. For some feet we can see clearly, but 
then our view quickly dims. We see shadows at the 
edge of the lights sphere, then deepening darkness. 
We know more is there but given our light, given 
our perspective, we cannot see it.^6 
From this frame, the act of theorizing is built out 
of the attempt of each to find his/her focus, his/her 
fireplace. The method of Currere is one "re-search" 
strategy for the cultivation of voice and vision. It 
involves the use of texts to stimulate biographical 
movement. The "re-search" cycle is regressive (a "re-view" 
of the biographic past), progressive (a dwelling in 
future states), analytical (a description of the 
biographic present, and an analysis of the three 
"photographs") and synthetical (a reconceptualization 
47 of the present situation). What emerges is a story 
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to be shared with the other "campers", a story of one 
individual's reconceptualization of his/her own exper­
ience : 
I no longer see what it is I see as I saw it, and 
it is because one I see differently, and two what 
is seen is different (his underlining).^ 
For example, Pinar's efforts up to this point amount 
to a re-conceptualization of "the individual". First, 
the attempt to recover one1s own biography leads to an 
insight into the necessity of restructuring curriculum 
content to honor the integrity of biographic meanings. 
And second, institutions (especially so-called 
educational ones) are seen through a new light, in 
terms of the contradiction between the abstract images 
of reality that people carry around in their heads and 
use to repress themselves and oppress each other, and 
the concrete biographic experience of these people as 
they struggle to live through tne dehumanizing structures 
49 of their sociality. This."re-search" strategy is 
political in the sense that (_it involves a new kind of 
relationship among "the campers" (let us call them 
university-based curriculum theorists). Truly hearing 
another's story (or his "case study") requires some­
thing more than a tolerant acceptance of "different 
points of view". It means not only that I accept this 
storyteller as he is, but that I confirm history; in 
myself, and then in him. I respond to those moments 
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wherein the story discloses, no matter how inchoately, 
what "the other" is meant to become. Pinar calls the 
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political dimension of Currere "cell work", and I 
think the image is apt. The stories are meant to 
uncover, in part, our concrete personal participation in 
the web of present-day political, economic, and cultural 
structures, and how our maintenance of and complicity 
with these structures holds us back both biographically, 
and historically. Thus, Currere gets at the use of the 
theorist's work, its biographic function, and is 
oriented towards developing the kind of clarity it 
takes to resist the pressures to use one's work, however 
unconsciously, in historically regressive ways. 
Once again, it is clear that this re-search strategy 
also has undeniable value for educators who are con­
cerned with generating a theoretical base for 
restructuring curriculum content. Surely we must have 
a body of theory that resonates with personal meanings. 
The kind of insights that have potential for making a 
significant difference in other peoples' lives are 
often the ones that have made a significant difference 
in our own. Not to acknowledge the biographic context 
of our work is tantamount to confessing a communicative 
incompetence that is bound to rub off on our students 
and colleagues, and can sink the whole project in its 
contradiction. Liberation signifies not a body of 
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theory, but an intensely human struggle to which the 
theory is dedicated. When the voice of such theory no 
longer resonates with the context of personal struggle 
and concern it makes a mockery of its intention. 
Nevertheless, I have become increasingly concerned 
about the methodological limitations of the biographical 
strategy. Biographic distress is but one index of our 
historical situation; self work is but a partial 
response. 
What strikes me most about the metaphor of the 
campfire, is that the "fireplace" is both ultimately, and 
quite concretely, communal. Among those who believe the 
meaning of existence to be disclosable in the relation of 
the individual to his self, liberation becomes a libera­
tion from the world and not a liberation of the world. 
Such a project adds little to the communal fireplace; 
such a focus is flawed. Pinar, I believe, recognizes this 
when he writes: 
It is unavoidable, given our fasticity, that is given 
our membership in the species, alive in the present 
historical era, that to some extent, in some way, 
this center circle, oneself, is in fact unsatis­
factory . 51 
However, I see this recognition that in the most 
profoundly concrete sense we share the same fate, the 
same human condition, as a powerful reminder that, 
ultimately, it is a mistake to view the "I" that is Ira 
Weingarten-in-his-uniqueness as the methodological center 
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of the universe. It would be irresponsible to substitute 
a focus on the individual in his "running of the course" 
(Currere) for a focus on "the course to be run" 
(Curriculum). The latter is most assuredly not re­
ducible to the former. While it would be monstrous if, 
in our concern for scope, we contributed to the relega­
tion of the individual to an appendage of a social-
political order, it would be tragic if, in our concern 
for resonance, we contributed to an equally powerful 
historical tendency towards the primacy of individual 
existence and towards its self-glorification. 
On The Methodology to be Employed in This Study 
This section presents a guide to the study, from 
the mind set in which it was framed through the various 
subsections in which it is cast. 
I brought to this study a twin concern: scope and 
resonance. It was clear to me that to honor both 
concerns would involve interfacing the ideas and 
commitments of the "critical theorists" and the 
"hermeneutical theorists" in some intellectually and 
pedagogically responsible way. While the metatheoretical 
investigations of Bernstein and Habermas helped 
immeasurably, I could find no clear exemplar in the 
literature. I concluded that the tone that I wanted to 
establish would have to be of my own making, and that I 
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would have to begin by setting a number of more or less 
arbitrary limits. 
Scope was uppermost in my mind throughout most of 
the months of reading, organizing, story telling and 
listening that proceeded the actual writing. I came 
across the concept "hegemony" early on in the process, 
and regarded it as the most fruitful concept to emerge 
from the critical tradition, as it had begun to impact 
upon thinking in Curriculum. Yet, for reasons indicated 
above, I was dissatisfied with this conception. Rather 
than using the concept as a point of departure for my 
writing, it became a conscious limit for my reflection. 
I was prepared, if I had to, to sacrifice some scope for 
a pattern of explanation that would have, I hoped, more 
pedagogical integrity to it (i.e., resonance). The 
limitation I set was both experimental and substantial. 
The moment my reflections began to take me outside of 
the pattern of relationships I was living through and 
trying to grasp, I consciously "cut them off", and 
struggled to find a more intimate, value-laden way to 
make sense of how we live together in America. 
I turned my attention outward. Through personal 
connections and various work activities, I sought to 
make a fresh start in understanding the terms by which 
other persons were making sense of the world they lived 
in, in the hope of finding the most meaningful terms 
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with which I could initiate and contribute to this pro­
foundly significant activity. My decision to, in effect, 
substitute "liberalism" for "hegemony" as a conceptual 
focus was the outgrowth of this experience. There were 
many reasons for this decision, some more conceptually 
compelling than others, some based almost purely upon 
intuition and others having to do with many of the 
meta-theoretical concerns I have already shared, but 
here I will try to reconstruct my rationale. 
First, my experience helped me to recognize that 
liberalism as an ideology pervades the schools. I 
also recognized that this may or may not be a con­
ceptually compelling reason to focus upon it. There 
are undoubtedly other ways of characterizing the world 
view of teachers and students in school. What began 
to persuade me of the potential of this approach was 
that the word "liberal" seemed to have meaning and 
significance for people. Teachers seemed to understand 
themselves as more or less "liberal". Students seemed 
to perceive their teachers as more or less "liberal". 
While no two persons I met used the word in the same 
way, and I eventually abandoned the idea of beginning 
the study with an attempt to define the concept in terms 
of the multifacited meanings people seemed to evoke by 
its expression, it was clear that the term carried with 
it a host of value-laden associations that when viewed 
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in their entirety presents a picture of life in America 
that surely does not lack for scope. However, this line 
of thought left me with a considerable conceptual 
problem. The bulk of contemporary political thinkers 
regard liberalism as an explicit political allegiance, 
not a form of life. And, it would have been impossible 
for me to continue had I not come across, quite by 
accident, a very special book that helped me to overcome 
this problem — Roberto linger's Knowledge and Politics. 
Unger's treatment of liberal doctrine provided me with 
the intellectual categories for fusing the language of 
liberalism with the deep structure of contemporary social 
life. Now, finally, I was convinced that my project was 
viable intellectually. 
A second, but related reason for focusing upon 
liberalism was that the meanings engendered by its usage 
seemed to conform to the same pattern in every institu­
tional context I investigated. At this point, I had 
begun work as a labor organizer, and had also begun to 
52 deepen my reading on liberalism. I found that as I 
began to crack this complex codification intellectually, 
and began to get a sense of what the liberal theorists 
of the enlightenment were up to, there was an immediate 
pay-off in my work. As the petition campaign of the union 
began to move into full swing, it set in motion a very 
productive relationship between the kind of practical 
insight such work can engender, and the theoretical 
insight that came from my critical reflection upon the 
history of liberal thought. I found in my union 
organizing that it was sometimes hard to "break the ice 
with workers who were naturally suspicious of my 
University background. My theoretical understanding of 
liberalism was of immeasurable value in breaking the 
ice that seemed to separate me from the workers I was 
trying to organize. 
This brings me to a third reason for focusing upon 
"liberalism" as opposed to "hegemony". One of the 
problems of working with critical theory is that it 
becomes very difficult for theorists to validate their 
interpretations. As Bernstein recognizes, critical 
interpretations are not reducible to the common sense 
interpretations of person's self-understanding of their 
everyday life, but neither can they be irrelevant to it 
In the end, the choice between liberalism and hegemony 
came down to a choice between the two spheres of 
validation that are appropriate to two different 
"levels" of critical theorizing. Habermas, for example 
in exploring the epistemological foundations of 
critical theory, hopes to develop "true statements 
(critical theorems) that can stand up to rational dis-
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course". Habermas makes a clear distinction between 
such discourse and action. Indeed he says "discourse 
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requires the virtualization of constraints upon action". 
By that he means that the function of critical theory, 
qua "theory" is to provide "true statements" about social 
reality. These kinds of statements can only be validated 
among those who are able to bracket the constraints of 
action and are free to pursue the best argument 
possible. In other words, there is a level of critical 
theorizing whose concrete referent is an enlightened 
community of scholars. I suspect that working from a 
relatively established "critical theorem" such as 
Hegemony in the way in which Apple describes can result 
in a number of middle-range conceptualizations of this 
type. However, critical theory also has another 
function which Habermas calls "the organization of 
55 processes of enlightenment" (by enlightenment here, 
Habermas means emancipation). This second function 
has both a theoretical and practical dimension to its 
reflection and its validation. In effect, we can say 
that here critical theorizing mediates between theory 
and praxis. The explanations it develops refer to 
"processes of reflection carried on within certain 
56 groups towards which such processes are directed". 
Bernstein, in discussing Habermas' distinction between 
these two levels of theorizing, attempts to clarify 
what "critique" means in this second context: 
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Critique., (becomes) .. a form of "therapeudic 
knowledge" — not in the debased sense so 
characteristic of contemporary fashions, but in the 
classical sense of paideia (education) directed to 
the cultivation, formation, and "turning" of the 
human psyche.^ 
In other words, critique that is directed to "the 
organization of processes of enlightenment" is validated 
partially by rational discourse ("Are the basic concepts 
historically accurate?".; "Can they have meaning for 
people outside the situation from which they have 
emerged?",etc.) , and partially by those persons or groups 
to whom the critique is directed. It seemed to me that 
what Bernstein called "therapeudic knowledge" was what I 
was after, and that focusing upon liberalism could pro­
vide me with a way of partially validating the 
interpretations I was beginning to develop at the early 
stages of this investigation. The focus on Liberalism 
provided me with a language that did indeed directly 
contribute to a process of enlightenment that I was 
attempting to initiate. While most of the concepts of 
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critical theory with which I was familar from my readings 
could not be validated in this sense because their mere 
utterance turned off people in droves, the new interpreta­
tions I was developing could be sculptured by this 
experience. Many of the subsections in Chapter I (that 
I will describe shortly) are based upon explanations 
that emerged from this experience. I am convinced that 
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explanations of the sort I have tried to introduce in this 
study do have potential for "the organization of the 
processes of enlightenment". 
As I moved towards the writing process, the concern 
for resonance became more pronounced. Armed with an 
emancipatory intent, and a set of meta-theoretical 
concerns for the field of curriculum theorizing, I had 
immersed to myself in an historical time, which I came 
to recognize by its liberal "grammar". Plow was I to 
reconstruct my reflective and practical experience in a 
way that was consonant with my intention and concerns? 
Essentially this involved me in a consideration of the 
relationship between wholes and parts and the 
problem of perspective. 
My experience formed a biographic/historical "whole". 
The "grammar" of liberal doctrine had encircled me, as 
anyone who tried to tal3< with me once the writing began 
in earnest can surely attest. However, my concern was 
not for this whole per se, but for the dialogical process by 
which it was formed and its potential to build more 
meaningful wholes in the future. To honor these con­
cerns , I would have to blend a narrative voice with a 
more insistent theoretical voice. The narrative 
voice would reconstruct the whole in terms of its 
related parts, and the theoretical voice would indicate 
how the parts both enlarged and challenged the whole 
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and eventually could lead us to a deeper one. I could use 
the first person point of view and active voice to 
introduce each major movement (or part), speaking 
directly to the reader and setting off this sort of 
communication from the main body of the narrative. As 
well, this kind of direct communication could be used at 
the conclusion to get some distance from the narrative, 
and to help both me and the reader to see some implica­
tions that would not otherwise be visible. 
Chapter I: Background and Commentary 
This became the methodological outline for Chapter I. 
The introduction begins with a diffuse, abstract whole--
the taken-for-granted conception of curriculum content-as-
response to the question "What do we teach in school?", 
and the liberal doctrine as integrating the psychological 
and political avenues of reflection that have constituted 
that response. The rest of the introduction is concerned 
with specifying, in non-technical language, what it is I 
am trying to achieve in this Chapter, and providing an 
anticipatory meditation upon the liberal consciousness 
that is intended to provoke the reader. 
In section two, the narrative begins. Here the 
epistemological categories of liberal psychological 
theory (the narrative voice) are played off (by the 
theoretical voice) against the human predicament they 
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disclose. This part of the narrative is meant to 
establish a concrete relationship between the categories 
of liberal thought and the quality of individual 
existence in our time. Thus, a part of the original, 
abstract whole (the use of psychological theory as an 
avenue of reflection that responds to the question 
"what do we teach in schools?") becomes an enlarged 
"concrete" whole, which offers a visceral challenge to 
the original one. 
Section two forms the theoretical heart of this 
study. The discussion of political man (pages 62, 63) 
is pivotal. Much of the discussion to follow depends 
upon the interpretation of liberal theory as an 
abstracted psychology. The distinction between 
encounter and meeting (pages 63, 64) provides a personal 
index for locating the limit situations of liberal 
doctrine. Out of this is developed a paradox that is 
both personal and political, and is the key to under­
standing how we can (at least partially) challenge this 
whole in our every day life. The discussion of contracts 
(pages 6 6-6 7) is useful in understanding how we confuse 
interpersonal situations with political ones, in a way 
that dishonors both. The juxtaposition of the theoreti­
cal voice, which is attempting here (pages 69-74) to 
demythologize the intellectual edifice of liberal 
political theory, with a narrative voice that provides 
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a series of panoramic images of the American political 
and pre-political scene, is meant to move the narrative 
deeper and deeper into the relationship between the 
categories of liberal political thought and the quality 
of social existence in our time. Once again, a part of 
the original whole (the part political reflection plays 
in responding to the taken for granted conception of 
curriculum content) has been enlarged, and serves to 
challenge the original whole, but now the "visceral 
grounds" for this challenge are at once psychic, 
ethical, political, and theological (and along the way a 
number of interpretations have been introduced that can 
be used to help us make this challenge). On page 74, 
the first person usage is employed to break the descent, 
and to begin a process of reconstruction that is meant 
to point towards a more meaningful whole. The discussion 
of institutional communications (pages 74-79) attempts to 
integrate many of the themes that have emerged, and 
bring them to bear on an interpretation of this life-form 
and the threat it poses to "the persistence of the human 
presence". The reconstruction begins in earnest on page 
79, where the conceptualization of liberal doctrine as 
curriculum content, latent all along, begins to be 
brought out into the open. The discussion of intention-
ality (pages 80-86) is primitive but insights into the 
relationship between private and public world, particular­
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ly the insights of Arendt (pages 83, 84), provide perhaps 
the strongest challenge to liberal doctrine this study 
presents. Her vision has been an inspiration to me, and 
her interpretive framework can be quite powerful 
practically. The interpretation of method (pages 8 7-9 3) is 
significant to the extent that it considers this category 
in a constitutive way, and perhaps can help us understand 
why curriculum theorists are so properly concerned with 
methodological critique. Method becomes both a psycho­
social (how we go about doing what we do) and an 
historical (the historically specific way in which ex­
perience translates itself into forms of symbolism and 
substance) category. Thinking this way about method 
calls my attention to the fundamental methodological 
reconstruction that would be necessary to move us beyond 
the liberal constellation, and the strategic role 
curriculum theory might be able to play .in this process. 
The interpretation of context brings this chapter to a 
summation. Three contexts are posited and briefly noted. 
The first is the brute reality of the buildings we 
occupy, but never seem to notice. In mentioning this, I 
try to move the reader outside of these buildings, and 
I ask that we grasp the panorama, of physical structure, 
humanly constructed, that surrounds us. The second 
context is meant to take the reader back inside to 
appreciate the full context of presence. This "full 
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context" is potentially more than just the curriculum 
content that is evoked by liberal doctrine, much more 
than what could have been made present by this narrative. 
Thus, I employ the first person usage again, to step 
back from what has been developed here, and draw 
together the parts in a more meaningful whole. This whole 
is portrayed in terms of three interrelated,contiguous 
dimensions of curriculum content. I am suggesting that 
while we may encounter most situations as interpersonal, 
there are always at least two other dimensions of 
curriculum content (intrapersonal and socio/political) for 
us to draw upon, present as possibility. Each dimension 
is distorted to some degree, and indeed to some degree 
this might be a constitutive element of the human 
condition. While these concepts are not developed in the 
body, I should like to affirm here my faith that movement 
is possible to the extent that we conjoin the dimensions 
in our praxis. Even within the present historical era, 
the potential is staggering. The old culture must be 
synthesized, concretized, and miniaturized to become 
"the curriculum" in the still invisible new age. 
Chapter II: Background and Commentary 
Having come through the circle , my attention turned 
towards the curriculum field, towards the 70 or 80% for 
whom the reconceptualization is perhaps interesting and 
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quaint, but distant. However, this would mean leaving 
something very important "up in the air" — the 
epistemological status of the dimensions of curriculum 
content. And I hesitated, not knowing which way to 
turn. To turn back into the top of the spiral that is 
Chapter I, and attempt an explicative reconstruction of 
the dimensions seemed important, though I wasn't quite 
sure how to do it. On the other hand, with my immersion 
in the liberal doctrine still fresh in my mind, it 
seemed a unique opportunity to speak to the questions 
"Why curriculum theorizing?", and "why is it so 
difficult?", in terms of the contexts that most curri-
cularists are concerned about; schools as institutions, 
the back-to-basics sentiment, school reform and so 
forth. And if my concern for resonance had really paid 
off, I should be able to generate interesting, insightful 
and fresh approaches to the topics, I reasoned optomisti-
cally. Moreover, the two questions were and are important 
to me; indeed I have never met a curriculum theorist who 
is not plagued with them every so often, so it was not a 
choice between performing a service and undertaking a 
labor of love. 
I will not attempt to rationalize the choice I made 
in esoteric methodological terms, although I did at the 
time (at least to myself). I needed to begin to address 
myself to curricularists who are not "critical theorists" 
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or "hermeneutical theorists", to try out a number of 
interpretations that followed from my earlier exploration 
and might have some potential for communicating with this 
broader audience, to establish a starting point for 
engaging in professional communication with this audience 
some time in the future. As well, I feart-d that I was not 
ready to actually construct a "new curriculum theory" 
(indeed I'm still not sure what form such a theory should 
take), although I believed I was ready, able, and indeed 
anxious to distinguish my viewpoint from others. 
Faced with this dilemma, I decided to divide Chapter 
II into two sections, each quite different in tone and 
approach. In section one I would address the twin 
questions "Why curriculum theorizing" and "Why so diffi­
cult", and experiment with interpretations, drawn from 
the narrative of Chapter I, that I hoped might have some 
potential for communicating with a broader context of 
curricularists. In section two, I would focus on 
significant texts, and critique them both in terms of 
each other, the broad body of understandings that 
Chapter I has generated, and the dimensions of curriculum 
content (but only to the extent that they had already 
been articulated). 
Section one begins by establishing the change of 
tone and perspective. Two predicaments are introduced 
(pages 96,97); "making hay" and "searching for the 
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paddle". The relationship with Chapter I is established 
directly thereafter (indeed to emphasize this connection 
I employ it in the title of this section). In effect, I 
am suggesting that, with respect to the simple context of 
raw, man-made physical structuring, the institution of 
education (all the elementary, secondary, colleges, and 
universities) can be profitably interpreted through the 
category of liberal methodology. This point of 
departure permits me to construct an analogy (pages 9 9-101) 
between the hypothetical-deductive model of inquiry (the 
process of mainstream science as ideal type and the 
bureaucratic structure of the Institution of Education. 
This sort of interpretation is obviously not as 
sophisticated as what could have been achieved by a 
systematic analysis of the problem, (as for example in 
the work of Apple and Feinberg in this country, Young in 
58 England, and Bourdieu in France). It would be 
irresponsible to push this analogy too far, but I think 
it has a great deal of heuristic value. Similarly, 
while the interpretation of the reading experience 
(pages I02-104)provides a powerful connection between 
the concerns of Chapter I and the very concrete concerns 
of the broad context of our profession, I regard the 
interpretation as heuristic, nothing more — but a 
richly potent one probably worth extending a bit further 
before it would break down. The point of view I take 
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on the "back to basics" phenomenon (pages 104-106), and it 
is no more than a point of view and not an analysis, is 
valuable and revealing and built directly out of the 
discussions of the first chapter. On page 10 6, I employ 
first person usage again to break this pattern of 
interpretive experiment, and begin a reconstruction that 
draws upon these interpretations and attempts to inte­
grate them with the whole body of Chapter I, for the 
purpose of responding to the twin questions "Why 
curriculum theorizing?" and "Why so difficult?". 
Basically I indicate that the problems as they are under­
stood by all parties concerned are not transparent (we 
understand that we misunderstand), and therefore 
curriculum theorizing is just as significant as it is 
difficult. We must pursue it if we are to challenge the 
institutional life-form, and ever hope to overcome the 
predicaments of "making hay" and "searching for the paddle". 
I feel the body of section 2 is sufficiently clear, 
and a step-by-step summary would be superfluous. However, 
some general comments are in order. 
In selecting texts, I began with two general con­
siderations. First, I wanted to chose works that had not 
been categorized by Macdonald or Pinar, or for that 
matter by myself in a Preliminary Statement I prepared 
several years ago. The reasoning was simple. In this 
section I do not, either by implication or design, want 
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to place texts in one category or the other, or in one 
schema or the other. I do not want to map the field, I 
simply want to shed light on the understandings this 
study has generated. I am presuming that this study 
enables me to see with more adequate eyes, and I did 
not want past biases to interfere. This consideration 
eliminated approximately thirty texts. The other con­
sideration was more qualitative. I wanted to chose 
works that were of obvious high quality. The 
reasoning here is also simple. In this section I am 
concerned with avenues of approach and not intellectual 
competence. 
The search process was informal. I examined scores 
of books, articles, monographs, but the moment I came 
across The Proceedings of the National Herbart Society, 
the first choice was made. In making this choice, there 
is an implicit statement I ought to clarify. Conventional 
wisdom has it that the publication of Franklin Bobbits' 
The Curriculum in 1918 signifies the beginning of the 
field. This is correct in the sense that before this 
era, curriculum was not a self-conscious area of pro­
fessional specialization. However, there is a limit 
to what we can learn from recognizing men such as 
Bobbit, Charters, and Snedden as the founders of the 
field. 
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In Macdonald's terms, we might just simply say that 
their work no longer forms a point of departure for 
thoughtful curricularists. Indeed, from a geneological 
point of view, I have my doubts as to whether these men 
are our "Fathers", if you will. Others who have pursued 
this question far deeper than I have yet to establish 
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time of reconceptualization, it is especially appropriate 
to review our origins. 
I have found much that is unquestionably significant 
in the early proceedings of the National Herbart Society 
(1895-1898). While section two critiques this body of 
theorizing in terms of the understandings that have been 
developed in this study, I've tried to indicate how 
delightfully surprised I was to find much in Herbartian 
thought that does offer a legitimate point of departure 
for curriculum theorists that do not accept everything 
I've had to say here. It should be noted that I address 
myself to the proceedings purely as an intellectual 
codification, and do not deal with the historical 
context of the 1890's. As well, I present a consensus 
view generalized from my readings of the presentations 
and debates. I do this so that I can treat this work as 
a body of theory. I believe this is fair, and not just 
a fabrication of my own mind. I recognize that while all 
Herbartians seemed to be aware of the language of 
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correlation and concentration, some believed in 
correlation, others concentration. I don't treat this 
as an issue, but simply as two options within a general 
framework. The same is true for Charles McMurray and 
Dewey's famous dispute over the pedagogical significance 
of the "cultural epoch hypothesis." 
The second text I chose, Paul Hirst's Knowledge and 
the Curriculum, did not even come from my library 
search, but was originally suggested by a member of my 
committee (Dr. James B. Macdonald). I must say that I 
had never heard of Hirst before that, and I was 
immediately fascinated and frustrated by his thought. 
Hirst represents perhaps the most careful, respectable, 
"traditional" approach to curriculum thinking. What 
struck me most was the contrast between Hirst and the 
Herbartians. This contrast helps to clarify the point 
of view this study advocates, and the four-way conver­
sation (Weingarten on the Herbartians, the Herbartians 
on Hirst, Weingarten on Hirst, Weingarten on the 
Herbartians and Hirst) indicates the distance that 
must yet be traveled to claim the promise of this point 
of view. 
My final comments are confined to conclusions I 
consider essential. The Epilogue is brief, expressing 
my conviction that there is much left to be done, for' 
we have only begun to scratch the surface. 
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CHAPTER I 
LIBERAL DOCTRINE AS CURRICULUM CONTENT 
Introduction 
Until quite recently, it has been widely acknowledged 
that the decisive question for curriculum workers is "What 
is to be taught in schools?" and that in responding to 
this question, we locate what can be called the "content" 
of the curriculum. In the process, questions of a 
psychological and political nature have been raised, and 
although consensus has never been attained when educators 
try to determine which of these two avenues of reflection 
deserve priority, their patterns of language usage make 
clear an otherwise hidden assumption that these avenues 
are somehow related. 
Not surprisingly, the nature of their relationship 
has seldom been treated as an object of conscious 
(• 
reflection. To do so, it would be necessary to recognize, 
perhaps as Roberto Unger does in Knowledge and Politics,"*" 
a stream of accessible, critical understanding that 
bridges the distance from the study of knowledge to the 
understanding of separate persons and their conduct, from 
the understanding of persons to the study of society, and 
from the study of society to the exercise of political 
choice. Here in Chapter I, I will suggest that liberalism, 
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both as a philosophical system that has its roots in Newton 
and Hobbes, and as a kind of psychological and political 
agenda that is still very much with us, has provided the 
field with just this sort of an understanding in the 
past, an understanding that must be considered by those 
who would seek revision, reform, reconceptualization 
or even revolution. 
Before we begin, it would help if what is meant by 
the expression "accessible, critical understanding" 
could be rendered somewhat more comprehensible. Von 
Wright (as quoted in Stake) does an excellent job of 
distinguishing between understanding and explanation. 
He writes: 
understanding is also ... as empathy . . . 
connected with intentionality in a way that 
explanation is not. One understands the aims 
and purposes of an agent, the meaning of signs 
and symbols, and the significance of a social 
institution or a religious rite.2 
The meaning of understanding is surely not the same as 
that of explanation. But to truly get to the heart of 
c 
the matter, it is essential to distinguish, as well, 
between understanding and comprehension. 
While I was coming of.age in Brooklyn, my mother did 
a most thorough job of informing me of this non-trivial 
distinction. If I had managed somehow to fail to meet 
her sense of my responsibilities on a given day, she 
would waste little time in describing for me what I had 
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done, or not done, and providing some instruction for the 
future, oftentimes, these evaluative moments would con­
clude as follows: 
"Now in the future, you are to , , ; versheten? " 
Believe me, before I felt ready to respond "versheten" 
(the Yiddish form for the German verstehen, which trans­
lates as "understand" in English), I would realize that 
what was required here was not a simple intellectual 
comprehension. Rather, the demand was for something 
approaching a "standing-under"; I was being asked to join 
my mother underneath the verbiage and truly stand with her. 
More than an agreement to apply for general instructions 
to upcoming circumstance, "standing-under" transformed 
my tacit meaning structures. I was left with a markedly 
different sense of these circumstances when I came up 
against them. 
So my expression of an intention to approach an 
accessible, critical understanding makes at least three 
demands. First, an understanding is accessible if it can 
be made present for another. In this case, my hope is 
that you will achieve some understandings while exper­
iencing this first chapter that are roughly consistent 
(though surely not identical) with those that I have 
achieved while thinking through what I have written. 
Second, an understanding becomes critical when it is 
experienced as somehow important, evaluative, and not 
without consequence for one's action in the world. In 
this case, the interpretation of liberal doctrine is 
critical in another sense as well. Realizing that the 
sheer scope of liberalism would place a life-time demand 
upon anyone who felt competent to attempt an exhaustive 
interpretation, I have quite consciously selected what 
I have chosen to focus upon. It is hoped that my 
critical selection of elements, motifs, and ideas from 
an almost infinitely dense liberal constellation will, 
upon your inspection, do more to clarify than to distort. 
Third, as the title of this chapter suggests, I do see a 
rather significant relationship between liberal psycho­
logical and political theory and the content of our 
curriculum. Thus, the third demand is that this 
connection that I see, which will require not only an 
interpretation of liberal doctrine but also a rather 
special conceptualization of curriculum content, will 
become present for you in some way as you experience this 
first chapter. This is a tall order, but I hope to fill 
at least some of it. 
Finally, some clarification of how I use the expression 
"liberal doctrine" might facilitate a more integrated 
experience for those of you who decide to follow this 
inquiry through until its conclusion. In thinking about 
liberal doctrine, I found it prudent to ground my 
critique in the inquiry rules and emotive patterns which 
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locate themselves in "parad gmatic microcosm" through the 
work of Newton and Hobbes. To put it another way, if 
liberalism could be responsibly portrayed as an intellectual 
framework that has, or has had a certain currency, it would 
be plausible and perhaps defensible to simply identify the 
main ideas. Presumably then, curriculum theorists 
would, could or should pick and choose among the main 
ideas, and having made some judgement as to their con­
ceptual and pedagogical fitness, they might be called upon 
in the pages to follow to exercise their scholarly dis­
cernment., or perhaps even their sense of civic or 
spiritual responsibility in preparing these ideas for 
presentation to the young in school. I assure you, this 
is not what I intend to say here. The more I have 
experienced, reflected, read, and worked, the less sense 
this kind of practice seems to make. 
If I may be allowed to make the zealot's mistake 
of anticipating the afterward in the midst of the 
forward, I would relate that ,the "private" fascination 
which carried me through this work was with the liberal 
consciousness , as opposed to present-day social policy 
decisions or second-order reflections upon the esoteric 
of utilitarianism. If there is to be any meaning in the 
evocation of a liberal consciousness (and I do not know 
if there must be), it would seem to lie in the image of a 
consciousness that denies itself — epistemologically, 
axiologically, viscerally — actually. One way to 
approach an understanding might be to comprehend the 
liberal consciousness in two moments. It seems to present 
itself as simultaneously affirmative, prescriptive, 
universalistic, and pessimistic, relativistic and 
particularistic. The paradox begins to resolve if we 
take cognizance of liberalism's checkered history. The 
affirmative moment recalls the early efforts of Newton, 
Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson, Kant, and a score of others. 
The spirit that triumphed over feudalism, papism, and 
irrationalism, established constitutional government and 
a rich bourgeois culture,has not entirely disappeared. It 
manifests itself "affirmatively" as a consciousness that 
comprehends "situations11 as a set of dilemmas that 
reasonable people should struggle to resolve, in the con­
text of preserving for themselves and their posterity a 
sense of human dignity and a framework of republican 
procedure. This quality of reasonableness, and faith in 
the ability of free individuals to fashion a morally 
enlightened science and technology has provided the 
liberal with continued, but surely less frequent and more 
episodic opportunities for affirmation and recognition. 
However, the original triumph carries with it, as well, 
the seeds of later distress and present-day anguish. 
While transparently successful in fashioning a social 
organization and protestant elan that encouraged a more 
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generous development of individual thought and action, the 
basic liberal understandings have by no means formed a 
set of universal principles that all people freely 
choose. It is most decisively unclear that this rigorous 
discipline, the liberal version of enlightenment, has 
been the path selected by many of those whom the liberals 
like to take credit for enfranchising. This may, in part, 
account for the underlying pessimism of a consciousness 
that, on the one hand, has upon occasion evidenced a 
capacity for sympathy and tolerance for what it considers 
its progeny. Often to the point of relativizing 
its essential commitments, yet at the same time it has 
evidenced a decided tendency to reject, renege, and sub­
merge itself and its enemies in a sea of marshmallow 
and arsenic .... 
But I have already said too much and it's time to 
let the body speak for itself. 
Liberal Psychological Theory 
c 
Although liberalism has been vitally concerned with 
"the integrity of the individual", liberal theory does 
not approach the person directly. Rather, as F. S. C. 
Northrup has so ably demonstrated, the liberal conception 
of man emerges from the attempts of Hobbes and Locke to 
systematically develop the philosophical consequences of 
3 modern physical science. Thus, in our attempt to 
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recover the liberal psychology, we must proceed, as 
liberalism does both historically and phenomenologically, 
from a pre-existent, scientifically necessary world to 
inquire about the status of the observer wh<p lives in 
it. 
We begin by imagining the world as a s^ stem of 
colorless, odorless objects. These objects exist in a 
single public space that is the same for everyone, 
regardless of what we might perceive, think, or desire. 
They are in perpetual motion, bouncing into each other in 
this way or that, existing in a single public time as a 
succession of events. The motion is not random, but the 
laws that govern, or that we suspect govern the relation­
ships between object-events are just as separate from the 
events themselves, or the objects they represent, as they 
are from our perception of them.^ 
Here, in a nutshell, is the frame of reference that 
liberal psychological theory presupposes. The virtues 
of the Newtonian system, the release it promised from 
religious dogmatism and passing fancies, were seized 
upon and extended into the realms of psychology and 
politics. Eventually, they settled deeply within the 
mental and social configuration that we can now compre­
hend as modern western civilization. 
This is not to say that, even within the liberal 
context, there is or ever has been a single fully agreed 
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upon conception of man. Philosophers still debate within 
these boundaries, and the underlying tensions still 
account for much of the dynamism of our time and place. 
Essentially, two interpretations of the Newtonian situation 
are possible. We can consider man as a creature of public 
time and space, or, to a greater or lesser degree, their 
creator. In effect, the liberal continuum runs from a 
view that understands man as a complicated physical 
mechanism, to one that defines a human being as a composite 
of a body, that is to say, a collection of the atoms of 
physics, and a mental substance that becomes conscious of 
colors, odors, sounds, pains, pleasures, and desires in a 
private personally relevant time and space when it is 
bombarded with the colorless, odorless objects of the 
5 public space and time of which the body is a part. It 
is certainly possible to separate out a number of con­
ceptually distinct positions along the continuum, or 
concentrate upon the disparity between its two poles, 
especially if one wishes to focus on the very real and 
significant diversity of viewpoints one finds among 
contemporary behavioral psychologists. It is also 
possible to separate out the substantive issues that the 
"hard psychologies" (i.e., perception, cognition, physio-
psyche) raise in areas such as basic brain research, 
biofeedback, special education and the like. The 
purposes of the present inquiry are, however, best served 
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by appealing to the underlying features that seem to 
govern the discourse and its implications for the way we 
think about ourselves. Thus, what must claim our 
immediate attention are the consequences of replacing the 
classical inquiry into man's essence, which proceeded 
from the question "what is man?", with a modern inquiry 
that proceeds from the question "how is man like the 
rest of the things in the world?". 
The first important consequences are primarily 
epistemological. Once the idea of immutable essences is 
jettisoned, we're left with a world that, in principle, 
at least, can be classified in numerous ways according to 
our purposes through particular languages or theories. 
The mind is in a peculiar predicament. It knows things 
through its senses, and the language or theory with which 
it operates . But since these sensations are purely 
private, and our language or theory is, at best, tenta­
tively and conditionally appropriate, it cannot be said 
that such knowledge is true. On the other hand, the 
presumption of a realm of real things independent of the 
mind that can at some point be known seems to be a basic 
feature of what we call science. Indeed, central to the 
belief in the progressive development of science is the 
presumption that we can check our observations out 
against the facts of this real world. But as we have 
shown, this real world exists, not as an essence, but as 
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theory, -a peculiar imagining of the mind that, in turn, 
g 
grounds the liberal conception of man. 
Lest we think this circular puzzle to be of purely 
antiquarian interest, or perhaps, a problem that can be 
safely relegated to mainstream scientists intent upon 
verifying their hypotheses, or even federal bureaucrats 
attempting to establish the advisability of legalizing 
Laetrile, we need only to consider how some of the 
pieces of the puzzle find their way into the most 
elemental aspects of every day liberal psychology. 
Recall that when we speak within the liberal frame­
work of conscious mind, we refer to our ability to per­
ceive sensations — odors, colors, feelings, and desires 
— and when we speak of theory, we refer to language that 
is constructed to help us understand the regular 
relationships between the things of the objective, public 
world. This is the sense in which the mind knows things 
through its senses, and the languages or theories with 
which it operates. Another way of putting this is to say 
that the self consists of understanding and desire, and 
7 the two are separate from one another. Immediately, a 
fiendishly complicated and historically rooted conundrum 
begins to translate itself into a nagging burden that 
permeates the personal landscape. Desires, it has been 
felt, act as the moving force of personal activity, while 
the understanding acts as a guide which directs this force 
57 
towards its chosen destination. The story of the liberal 
psychology revolves around the exploits of these two 
forces. The predominate motif suggests that these two 
forces are doomed to. do battle in the psyche of man, and 
the stakes, as Hobbes reminds us in his Leviathan, are 
high. Unchecked desire conjures up the liberal image of 
disaster. The sordid image of "the state of nature", 
where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short", 
a condition which, as Sheldon Wolin persuasively argues 
"has the same universal significance and dramatic 
intensity for the I-Iobbesian myth as man's fall from 
9 grace has for the Christian myth", is but one of many 
vehicles that serve to etch this message of fear in the 
hearts of modern men. 
Moreover, desires, by which we may now refer, in 
rough historical sequence, to appetites, pleasures and 
pains, ends, goals, values, conscious interests, and felt 
needs, are arbitrary from the perspective of the under­
standing. While the political consequences are perhaps 
the most obvious -- "preference functions" become the 
only legitimate index for judging the response-ability 
of government, while the distribution of knowledge and 
the quality of that knowledge is considered a "pseudo-
issue", the psychological consequences are equally 
telling. It serves to limit the role of reason to that 
of an instrumentality. To be sure, reason is still quite 
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capable of making the desires an object of the under­
standing. In this sense, desires have the double aspect 
of psychic events to be explained scientifically by an 
empirical psychology, and internally experienced forces 
which are to be monitored and managed by the moralists. 
However, this bifurcation of the situation into two 
realms of discourse (ethics and empirical psychology) 
merely functions to mask the underlying premises to which 
they both refer. 
Within the liberal framework, reason cannot tell us 
what ends to choose;it can merely direct our attention to 
the most efficient and effective means for making the 
choice, and having made it, for achieving our objectives. 
The opposition of means and ends presupposes the contrast 
between objective, public knowledge, and arbitrary, 
private desire. At best, those who are possessed by the 
Hobbesian mythology and driven to seek refuge in the 
temple of reason, (and thus find themselves aligned with 
a tradition that reaches baQk to Kant) can argue that 
there are certain rules we must accept in order to engage 
in moral criticism. Unless we make the choice to accept 
the rules, we cannot justify to ourselves or our fellows 
the satisfcation of any of our desires. The problem is 
that so long as we maintain the opposition between reason 
and desire, means and ends, fact and theory, description 
and evaluation, these rules are condemned to be either 
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coherent and empty or incoherent and self-defeating. For 
the rules to be universally acceptable, they must maintain 
a formal neutrality with respect to the desires of 
individuals, hence becoming abstract shells. To breathe 
substance into the formal principles, one has to abandon 
the pretension of neutrality, yet it was precisely to 
avoid the need to choose among equally arbitrary desires 
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that the project was pursued in the first place. While 
this peculiar predicament will be given the more extensive 
treatment it deserves in the pages to follow — it is 
relevant here as examplifying the more general strategy 
that Michael Polanyi has called pseudosubstitution: 
The actual subject matter is restricted to a 
fragment found suitable for formalization. This 
formalization, if carried out strictly produces a 
result that is strictly, in itself, empty of any 
bearing on the subject matter; but by calling it 
an "explanation", (or in this case, a universal 
moral principle with "empirical support") . . . 
one inbues it with the memory of that informal 
insightful act of the mind which it was supposed 
to replace . . . This we may call pseudo-sub­
stitution. A pseudo-substitution is a gesture of 
intellectual self-destruction that is kept 
within safe bounds by its inconsistency... 
In effect, liberal psychological theory substitutes 
a behavioral technology for the memory of human exper­
iencing — but, unknowingly, relies upon this tradition 
of remembrances as the context which allows their 
technology to "make sense". We substitute job for work 
and call it "making a living"? we substitute sex for love 
and passion and call it a "meaningful relationship". 
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We may still seem to be obscuring the issues when we 
focus so intently upon the esoterica of liberal thought. 
But the tensions, convolutions, anomalies, and intellectual 
sleights of hand which we have evoked in this far too 
encapsulated treatment are meant to project something of 
a feel for the fate which falls with such bewildering 
force upon those to whose moral experience the principles 
of liberal psychology refer. An epistemological chasm 
all too effectively isolates a private world of colors, 
odors, textures, longings, fears, commitments, and as we 
shall discover, consciousness -- from a public world 
that is denied the stuff of human experience. This is a 
world of object-events, mechanical regularities and 
distorted role relationships, typically unable to meet 
its responsibility to bring forth an experience of 
continuity and worldly community, or in Hannah Arendt's 
terms, "to assure us of the reality of the world and 
13 ourselves". Living through the chasm is a treacherous, 
scary , often empty business-. 
Up to this point, we have proceeded as if the con­
tinuing presence of the categories of the liberal 
psychology depended exclusively upon a philosophical 
tradition and a lively imaginative facility. Surely, by 
now, it should be apparent that these principles draw 
their power in association with a dominant socio-political 
organization. Section 2 of this chapter aspires to 
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clarify this matter, in the course of elucidating liberal 
political theory as curriculum content. 
Liberal Political Theory as Curriculum Content 
In section two we introduced ourselves to some of the 
basic concepts that depict a liberal psychology, and por­
trayed, in literary vein, that psyche coming up against a 
deeper memory and projecting, in present-day, a decided 
tension and melancholia. Here in section three, we will 
eludicate the predominant themes of the liberal political 
theory, and inquire into the popular and generic images 
which sustain them "all of a piece". From there we 
undertake to connect the theory to contemporary social 
practices; and analogously, to much of what we come up 
against in our sociality. We do this by attempting to 
understand the liberal political theory as an historical 
intention, a methodology, and finally, a context. In 
effect, this section will carry the task of showing how 
liberal doctrine can direct our attention towards the 
ensemble of relationships we actually live through; that 
is to say, the "content" of our "curriculum". To 
understand liberal political theory as curriculum con­
tent is not to understand curriculum content per se, 
but I think/believe it can point towards such an under­
standing . 
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Liberal political theory, as we shall understand it 
here, refers simultaneously to a rich intellectual tra­
dition, a particular institutional apparatus (the system, 
if you will)., and an all-embracing understanding that 
mediates the two in the course of carrying itself 
through the vicissitudes of everyday life. Its scope is 
enormous when viewed this way. 
Recalling our discussion in Section 2, it may seem 
that liberal political theory would have to concern 
itself explicity, and not merely upon our interpretation, 
with what we have called the public world. And, apparent­
ly, it does. Does not our common parlance suggest that 
liberalism represents a certain orientation to this public 
world, perhaps a disposition to vote this way or that on 
the great issues of the day, or failing that, a commitment 
to the enduring values of freedom, order, equality, 
individualism, due process and the like, with the inevit­
able conflicts or "trade-offs" between and among them? 
Yet, such a view mistakes itself in that it confuses the 
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focal object of attention with the "content" that it 
actually captures. Harold Lasswell illustrated the point 
nicely when he conceptualized modern "political man" as a 
product of private motives displaced on to public objects 
14 and rationalized in terms of the public interest. 
However, once we have recognized the vitality and 
richness of the world which falls under the rubric of 
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what liberalism calls "private motives" (Section 2), 
Lasswell's formulation becomes rather timid. We are 
ready to comprehend "political man", within the liberal 
framework, as nothing more than a concept which abstracts 
out of the personal landscape those qualities, attributes, 
or patterns of conduct which might occasion public con­
troversy, and posits a pattern of relationship between 
and among these now abstract categories (e.g., black-white, 
rich-poor, woman-man, Jew-Moslem, child-adult, or student-
teacher, client-professional, worker-manager, etc.) and 
the state (or, more generally, the institutional apparatus). 
More importantly, for our purposes here, it follows that 
this pattern of relationship would be thought of as an 
irreducible element in the total stream of human inter­
action, and experienced as such by those for whom the 
theory holds. 
In this sense, we are all "political men and women" 
when we act upon the intuitive principle that 
"relationships are a mattertof convenience". The element 
of quid pro quo in human relationship corresponds to 
the psychological situation to which the liberal political 
theory both appeals, facilitates, and over time, comes to 
sponsor. Yet, side by side with the sense that we 
initiate encounters because they are in our interest and 
expect others to respond having performed the same 
calculus, is, I believe, a deeper sense that real human 
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affection and care is possible. Indeed, it is this 
deeper sense that was drawn upon to construct the con­
clusion to Section 2 of this chapter. 
When we step out of the encounter mode, and move 
towards a meeting, we live an experience that intuitively 
grasps a partial critique of liberal doctrine. As Martin 
Buber reminds us: 
In a living relationship with things, man not only 
regards them technically and purposively, but turns 
to them in their essential life... In an essential 
relationship with man, similarly, one life opens to 
another so that one experiences the mystery of the 
other being in the mystery of one's own... In our 
age, in which the true meaning of every word is 
encompassed by delusion and falsehood, and the 
original intention of the human glance is stifled 
by tenacious mistrust, it is of decisive 
importance to find again the genuineness of 
speech and existence as We... Man will not persist 
in existence if he does not learn anew to persist 
in it as a genuine We.-^ 
Indeed, the dominant tradition with culminates in today's 
liberal constellation has always recognized, however 
uncomfortably, a world of events and meetings that is 
characterized by mutuality and directness; Aristotle 
spoke of phila or fellow feeling. Jesus spoke of love, 
Aquinas of charity, Hume of sympathy; and even Compte and 
Durkhein did not deny the existence of altruism. While 
few have said with Buber "all real living is meeting", 
all have known a time/space that does not correspond to 
the Newtonian construction — an anthropological time in 
which the future is undetermined because it depends in 
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part upon our decisions, a phenomenological time that 
points each of us toward his/her unique presence in the 
peculiar rhythm of self and other — all of us know what 
it means to forget oneself to lose track of time 
The self we have upon occasion "forgotten" is the 
purposefully constructed, socially mediated liberal 
individuality; the time we lose track of is the abstract 
signal of a liberal epistemology. 
Although the potential for negation inheres within 
the direct immediacy of the lived moment and the 
reflective knowledge of thoughtful persons everyv/here, 
on the whole, the world of everyday life has come to 
fit a form from which the liberal political theory can 
continue to derive its legitimacy. The everyday life 
contracts we make with each other do provide an 
arrangement that we may safely presume to be occurring 
unless we decide to call it off. Indeed good 
manners often constrains one from asking for a 
suspension of the arrangement, and leaves one in a 
situation where chit-chat is oft-times resorted to in 
an attempt to mitigate against the aesthetically 
unpleasing "bottom line", and fill the empty and nega­
tive spaces. The contradiction between the clarity of 
human experience, and the convolution of its expression 
in forms of symbolism and substance, is the central 
problem of our time. 
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While the liberal political theory derives its sense 
of "contract" from the interpersonal situation, the 
contract it asks us to accept is one between a given 
individual and the state, and not the person and his 
neighbor. This intellectual sleight of hand, what 
Habermas might call the projective generation of higher 
order, purely abstract "subjects", retains its polemical 
power as long as the contract we initiate and suspend in 
everyday life is not thought of as an arrangement between 
groups or classes and institutional structures. Thus, we 
see that the organic nature of the interpersonal contract 
still holds together enough to make the idea of a con­
tract intuitively appealing, but allows us, in effect, to 
break our interpersonal contracts (as in say, divorce) or 
transcend them (in moments of meeting) without directly 
threatening the political order. Political radicals 
never seem to tire of making the point that those who 
believe their new, "free", "communal", "spiritual", and/or 
hedonistic life style to be "revolutionary", are only 
kidding themselves, or the victims of a decided naivete. 
Such a view equates the realm of politics with the 
personnel, practices and policies of the state and 
derives its cogency from the perceived absence of 
connection between individual expressions of justice, 
mercy, or creativity, and the state apparatus. 
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However, in those moments when we explicitly 
acknowledge and act upon the "political contract" that 
concerns itself with the relationship between individuals 
and institutional structures, other aspects of the 
liberal political theory come into play and tend to direct 
the relationship in a way that confirms the theory and 
sustains the world that has been built in its image. For 
example, when we pay our taxes, some of us may feel it to 
be unreasonable to pay so much for the sewer system, the 
school system, the welfare system, hospitals, and so 
forth. But here, we see that the phenomenon of "tax 
revolt" does not seem to threaten the political regime 
(although it may threaten a whole generation of its lead­
ers) . One explanation is that the arguments of the 
liberal political theorists, arguments that were skill­
fully constructed to convince an 18th-century world to 
move towards secular republican government, have settled 
so deeply into our present-day thinking that they can 
still define apparent efforts to suspend the contract in 
a way that simply does not threaten it. For example, is 
not John Lockes' argument (that our mere use of the 
facilities and participation in society constitutes an 
acceptance of the contract, and that it should remain in 
force unless we can clearly demonstrate profoundly 
disturbing consequences on a calamitous scale) still 
accepted by many of those whose voting behavior situates 
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them as participants in this so-called "tax revolt"? 
After all (and now who is it that is speaking, John Locke, 
or the voters of California?), we must realize that each 
generation cannot start afresh and construct its own con­
tract; would then be anarchy — chaos. How could we 
determine where to begin, and who would protect us from 
the threat of outside invasion, epidemic or worse, as we 
busied ourselves finding out? 
John Rawls might amend Locke here, by asking us to 
hypothesize an "original condition", where free 
individuals, totally unaware of their particular histori­
cal circumstances, negotiate a contract to establish 
their political relationships, and then he might ask us 
to judge the fairness of our tax by asking if it could 
have resulted from such a hypothetical event. Again, 
though very few persons may know who Rawls is, or the 
nature of his argument, his ideas and the burden they 
impose upon those v/ho would seek to challenge the 
legitimacy of the regime have real currency and power. 
For example, present-day social policy invariably 
begins by isolating problems such as inequality 
from the ensemble of social relations. Structural 
attempts at solution transpose the now identified 
problem into abstract quantitative terms that cannot 
possibly capture the full dimension of the perceived 
injustice. The planners' solution is no solution at all, 
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not even in principle, and it is not extraordinary for 
this to be publically recognized by the planners them­
selves. But the injustice is reduced to commonplace. 
Establishing its presence is no longer a liberative 
activity, but a complex, banal, bureaucratic procedure. 
Connections between particular incidents and criti­
cally revealing cultural thematics are deflected. The 
problem has been named, limited, and serviced, and the 
new services expand the ideological resources of the 
state. Contracting continues to be experienced as an 
interpersonal activity, but its logic surely governs our 
sense of collective responsibility and purpose. 
With this in mind, it becomes possible to comprehend 
contract theory and the potent images to which they 
appeal. Within the liberal political theory, attempts 
to focus upon institutions, or the basic structures of 
society which support them, begin by taking two steps 
backwards. First, the relevant qualities, attributes 
and patterns of conduct of the personal landscape are 
abstracted out and projected across the public screen, 
the better to reveal the political, calculative quality 
of the relationships between the now abstract individuals, 
as their interactions are mediated by historical circum­
stance. This situation is used quite explicitly as the 
contemplative frame for contemporary social policy. 
Secondly, the historical situation itself must be 
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abstracted out to reveal a primitive "state of nature" 
(Hobbes) or a hypothetical "original condition" (Rawls) 
from which political history can be reconstructed 
theoretically to make the basic structure of society and 
its institutional apparatus seem intelligible and secure, 
and to convince us that we need the liberal doctrine. 
The formal pattern of this theoretically recon­
structed political history is where the fundamental 
images of the liberal political theory come from. John 
Rawls expresses the pattern thusly: 
A simplified situation is described in which 
rational individuals with certain ends and related 
to each other in certain ways are to choose among 
various courses of action in view of their 
knowledge of their circumstance. 
The revelations of the Watergate era, following upon the 
heels of Vietnam, made us all familiar with one sort of 
language that adheres to this approach. Executive 
departments prepare options for "the president", which 
present him with various courses of action. These 
options are circumscribed, f.rom their inception, by "the 
certain ends" which are tacitly, and sometimes explicitly 
accepted, and the political infighting revolves around 
"the certain ways in which the parties are related". It 
is possible, once the rich, dense, social and political 
reality is flattened to conform to the "simplified 
situation", to construct a political "science" that has 
as its goal the explanation and prediction of what gets 
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to be considered an issue and what doesn't, and what the 
probable outcome of the decision making apparatus will be, 
given the inputs. Politics, then, becomes an institu­
tionally situated and bounded activity whose "purpose is 
the management of conflict, ...operationalized through 
transactional relations between independently situated 
18 
political actors". That phenomenon such as "tax 
revolt" and "affirmative action" have contradictory 
consequences is not considered anomolous, but thorough­
ly consistent with the Hobbesian inspired pattern. 
Frank Coleman's description of contemporary American 
politics captures this dynamic in formal terms: 
The states1 policing power is organized to 
channel self interested calculations of rulers 
and ruled towards identities of interest, and in 
so doing, reinforce the state's position in the 
management of social conflict. ^ 
Here we locate the more popular images of contem­
porary political life — skull sessions in the Oval 
Office, arm twisting in the congress, grandpa goes to 
Washington and finds his fellow senators are not real 
human beings. These images are something more than media 
reflections. They are immensely powerful reminders of 
how we have come to regard that life — as if it were a 
movie shot on some faraway location. To realize that 
the script betrays the characteristics of a venerable 
though surely tattered British import, and counts us all 
as actors and not as audience is not enough. The 
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movie consciousness must be understood and dissolved, 
if the formal pattern of the liberal political theory is 
to be altered. 
Our analysis of liberal doctrine has stressed its 
integrated, practical character. It has helped us to 
illuminate -- in graphic, broad brushstroke -- the 
America we live through together. Obviously, it is not 
the logical brilliance of the great liberal philosophi­
cal treatises that holds this theme together as a word 
that is given to us, although we can locate these themes 
in that logic. Experiencing one's life as if it were a 
movie is not quite what Newton and Hobbes suggested. As 
well, it would be a mistake to undertake here an explora­
tion of late-industrial economics, since this aspect of 
our existence is part of the "consensus" we are attempting 
to understand. Rather, we need to suggest, however 
incipiently, the theological intensity of our taken-for-
granted conmiitment to this way of regarding ourselves, 
our being with others, and the structural context within 
which these encounters and events occur. 
Drawing once again upon John Rawls1 theoretical 
reconstruction, we can conclude that while the formal 
pattern of the liberal political theory remains fairly 
constant over time, the generic image which sustains it 
"varies depending upon how the contracting parties are 
conceived, upon what beliefs and interests they are said 
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to hold, and upon which alternatives are available to 
20 them". It follows that the languages of legitimation 
and apparent dispute would change with changing empirical 
circumstances. And there is surely some significance to 
be attached to the historical development of these pre-
political images from Hobbes1 world of mutual hostility 
and dependence, to Rawls1 world of mutual disinterest. 
It is not that one world has simply replaced the other. 
The Hobbesian scenario has not lost its power to capture 
the imagination of 20th Century America, just as surely 
as the spector of an Id cut loose from its Super Ego, 
which N. 0. Brown tried to evoke in the '60's, left even 
the likes of a Herbert Marcuse deeply perplexed. Rather, 
given the underlying motif of fear and chaos (Hobbes), 
what seems to have occurred is that the growing complexity 
of the contemporary predicament has occasioned a demand 
for greater clarity under the guise of a thoroughly 
antiseptic reenactment of the proverbial rite of passage 
(Rawls). We'll develop this image further in Chapter II, 
Section 1, when we discuss "the reading experience". Our 
point here is merely to emphasize the depths to which 
these prepolitical images appeal. They serve to sustain 
the actual argument by erecting a psychic barrier which 
must be penetrated if one is to escape their grasp. 
Underneath the verbiage, coloring the whole of the 
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particular circumstances, liberalism represents an 
embarrassed struggle with the dynamics of original sin. 
In effect, what I've been saying up to this point is 
that liberal political theory sits in a rather peculiar 
dialectical relationship with what we have called the 
public world. On the one hand, the theory has contributed 
to both the de-energizing of the public world and the 
development of a bloated and limpid private realm. At the 
same time, it has served as a vehicle by which individuals 
speculate about the public world, and finding themselves 
in some structured relationship with other people, act 
from and through that interpersonal relationship upon 
their images of this world. We can liken this dynamic, 
wherein the boundaries of the public and private worlds 
21 begin to lose coherence, to grafting. What once was 
public becomes private, while the "stuff" of the private 
realm can no longer be kept with confidence in confi­
dence; the signposts blur -- the human presence begins 
to disappear. 
We see this most clearly in the phenomenon of 
institutional communications. The language of institu­
tions re-presents the scientism to which we have been 
referring. Having developed their own language, their 
own view of time and space, institutions effect 
communications which necessarily submerge the personal 
and collective consciousness due to the latter's being 
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conceived as a pathogenic threat to the former's well 
being? to the institution's ability to maintain these 
arbitrary definitions. Reality is flattened and made 
one-dimensional by a purposive esthetic which seeks to 
submerge our subsidiary awareness of what could be 
2 2 possible. The language of institutions tends to assume 
what is manifestly false — a one-to-one correspondence 
between language and reality. (If the memo says it 
snowed today, then it snowed today!) Thus, the by now 
cliched analogy with computer language is strong and 
positive; efficiency depends foremost upon the lack of 
apparent ambiguity of the communication and the absence 
of freedom. In effect, a particular kind of distortion 
in communication — the communique — is in fact chosen 
to delimit and diminish human concerns and ensure con­
straints. As such, emphasis is given towards developing 
these pseudo-communications; creating categories and 
variations of categories of communiques which are 
directed towards hiding and devaluing one1s personal 
curriculum and restraining collective potentialities. 
We all pay quite a price for the fundamentally oppres­
sive human effort that is required to organize our 
social practice in a way that corresponds with "the 
simplified situation" that John Rawls depicts. 
To make this perspective clear, we need to show how 
it can, in principle, illuminate a particular aspect of 
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institutional life. We are in agreement with John Dewey, 
when he argued in Reconstruction in Philosophy that, in 
the end, "what we want light upon is this or that group 
of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this 
23 or that special institution or social arrangement". 
And while the point of view we have began to build could 
never be applied to particulars as one might apply 
paste to one's favorite automobile, for now, let us. 
select outstanding motifs from the particular institu­
tional context of the school for the limited purpose of 
exemplifying the framework we are just beginning to 
develop. 
In schools, grades are used as judgements, surface 
expressions of a complex interactional experience serving 
as the Newtonian equation of the lived experience; 
•obviously, we have communiques in the name of efficiency. 
Where efficiency in reflection seeks the human connec­
tion, grades may be expressed in or joined with 
commentary of the experience from the perspective of the 
person-as-.institutional~agent: the "Teacher". That 
this communique carries more data need not be denied, 
but that it is a communication concerning trust must be. 
For, such a communication simply requires the relative 
observations of those involved; the persons who, created 
and shared the experience must be acknowledged. And 
while there is uncertainty, these efforts must be 
directed towards a meeting ground, if they are to express 
one's freedom and reaffirm one's effort towards quality. 
However, that we continue to view the educational 
environment within the prism of liberal doctrine means 
that we respond to bodies and not persons or ideas, and 
are in perverse point of fact justified in using the 
Newtonian/Hobbesian model. Teachers and students, 
labels to suggest falsely that one group knows what the 
other wants to know, are assigned to rooms and times as 
if time and space were not contiguous and relative to 
the person and his/her thoughts, as if space were 
defined by the number on the door and time by the 
additive collection of the "school day" and not by the 
24 esthetic quality of the phenomenological experience. 
It is interesting to note in this connection that Dewey, 
in his contribution to the Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology, went so far as to refer to Hobbes' 
25 philosophy as "the science of bodies". 
What makes this situation so profoundly destructive 
to the persistence of the human presence, is the contra­
diction between the constructed reality of the 
institution, which carries the burden of locating the 
last vestiges of the public space, and the current well-
intentioned emphasis upon therapeutics. Such is the 
stuff from which many a traumatic moment follows, when 
persons come up against this powerful contradiction. 
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I'm sure that each of us has a story to tell in this 
regard. Again, I will locate this story "in school": 
The story concerns a student, Carol, who came to see 
me at my office at the University some three years ago. 
She was crying uncontrollably, and thoroughly upset. 
As we tried to piece together what had happened, it 
became clear that she had just returned from a local 
elementary school, where she was helping out as a 
teacher's aide. The school prided itself on its "open 
classrooms", and boasted the latest modular furniture 
and so forth. On this day, in Carol's class, there was 
a particular boy who, upon finishing his drawing, had 
called her over to share his excitement. As she came 
towaards him, he placed his hands around her, and this 
made Carol happy. Only, just then the principal arrived 
upon the scene, and chewed out that child mercilessly 
for having the audacity to touch a teacher. 
I wondered in my own mind why Carol was so broken-up 
by this. Surely it was a vulgar experience, but why did 
it appear to be one from which she would not completely 
recover? Was it that Carol experienced the boy coming 
up against a powerful vise — a contradiction between 
the institutional and the interpersonal reality that was 
all the more telling in this case because of the fact 
that it occurred in a so-called "open" environment? 
Obviously, I cannot say with any certainty, but we do 
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recognize, in communications theory, that the strength 
of a message varies proportionately with its unexpected-
2 6 ness, and when the principal said "we don't touch 
teachers here", we can only imagine how profound a 
communication it was. We see as well the basic dynamic 
of institutional communications at work. In the absence 
of a communication that is open to locating the relative 
experience of those involved, and oriented towards the 
human meeting ground, the form and content of language 
are disjointed; in the case of schools, the form is of 
the appearance of learning, while the content is 
something else again. Just what the content is , we 
are not prepared to speak about as yet, but now that 
the question can be raised, it will occupy our attention 
for the balance of this Dissertation. 
We realize that once we can speak of a rather un­
differentiated social space, we can begin to talk about 
the adequacy of that space and the kind of lives that 
transpire within it. Here is where the "content" of 
liberal political theory becomes relevant. I want to 
consider liberal political theory as curriculum content 
because such a perspective forces us to grapple with it 
as a concrete presence in the world. In forcing its 
"thing-like" character into the open, we must recognize 
the obvious — a "theory" is not a "thing". However, 
over time, important ideas do leave their mark on the 
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world. We say that the architect erects a building in 
his mind before he literally builds it. We all aspire 
to "make our ideas a reality" — whether it is our 
dream house, the fantastic journey we hope to take to 
some faraway land, or the more humble aspirations we 
have for everyday projects of work and family. 
Similarly, we've been taught to think of social 
collectivities as "bringing-forth" different kinds of 
"things". In history classes, back in high school and 
even before, we were taught to memorize the distinctive 
contributions of Greece, Rome, The Stone Age, the New 
Deal, and so forth. Unfortunately, to learn that 
Pericles bequeathed the theatre, Augustus the sports 
arena, the stone age man his tools, and FDR the social 
security office, is simply not the kind of thinking 
that can take us very far. But, when we step out from 
underneath an interpersonal world-view, these matters 
become, at first, maddeningly complex, and hopelessly 
vague. How do we begin to seek out the meaningful 
connections? 
At this juncture, I think we have established that 
liberal doctrine represents a powerfully relevant idea-
structure that can help us to come to grips with present 
circumstances. Having sedimented itself into our 
personal and collective practice over the past three 
centuries, we encounter it as if it was the world, as 
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if it was "the content of our curriculum", (and this 
despite the persistence of events and meetings that do 
not "fit", and tell us that somehow "it's all terribly 
wrong"). 
If we are to make sense of this encounter — of 
the special world that it presumes — I suggest we 
begin by considering the possibility that this murky 
predicament has an intentional character to it. This 
does not mean that we must attribute to the vast, vague 
complexity we participate in a single cause. To my 
mind, this would be ridiculous. On the other hand, a 
meaningful interpretation must be rendered. To imply 
that the world we "come up against" is simply random 
and directionless is a prescription for complete 
passivity and thorough confusion. When we speak of 
liberalism as an historical project, we usually refer to 
the enlightenment as a human epoch; to its struggles, 
its hopes, its achievements, and its failures. Though 
we still may speak of it in past tense, we must 
recognize, first, that it's grounded in a distinctive 
interpretation of the inter-personal situation: the 
contract. The contract refers, not only to an 
idealized vision of the proper relationship between 
free individuals, but projects as well as peculiar 
social tapestry, and indeed implies a particular kind of 
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relationship between this basic social structure and the 
institutions whose task it becomes to manage it. 
In this connection, it becomes at least suggestive 
to note that the generation which proposed this contract 
was the generation which, as Richard Sennett points 
27 out, was also the first to self-consciously identify 
the bifurcation of everyday life of which I have been 
speaking. It was just as industrial capitalism was 
beginning to erect a structure of private industry, and 
as Stephen Lukes points out, "the basic ideas of 
2 8 individualism" were being formed, that we find Butler 
(1723) in his Sermons making the remarkable and pro­
foundly prophetic observation "every man is to be 
considered in two capacities, the private and the 
29 public". It was this generation whose sons, and as 
we've begun to understand, whose daughters as well, set 
out to concretize this project -- given its most power­
ful treatment by Thomas I-Iobbes, sculptured by what 
Peter Gay calls "the enlightenment philosophies 
30 (despite the philosophical divergences), and so many 
others — and make it present for Western Civilization. 
Two hundred and fifty years later, Butler's distinction 
remains central to our "rough and ready" epistemology, 
but the lives we live "in both capacities", as he might 
have put it, have suffered greatly from an increasing 
lack of connectiveness, to the point where neither 
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capacities can be explored today in a way that satisfies 
our sense of a human destiny. 
Hannah Arrendt locates historically the "memory of 
human experiencing" (Chapter I, Section 1, page 59) 
which we draw upon when we use expressions such as "A 
Human Destiny". The Human Condition, she argues, grows 
limpid when it comes to deny its essential publicity. 
In the absence of a "public sphere" which free persons 
enter into to do great deeds and thus transcend their 
mortality, there is, concomitantly, a loss of the kind 
of recognition we need to sustain our private exper­
iencing. The public sphere can be portrayed through 
the metaphor of a table, concrete and solid enough to 
both separate us in our unique seats, and unite us in 
our common meeting. Arrendt's sense of contrast 
captures a powerful analytic and aesthetic pivot, as 
she derives this quintessential pretxis of human being 
from the associative forms of Greek life, and inter­
prets the development of these forms through the course 
of Western history. She is most persuasive in arguing 
that the systematic dirnunition of labor, work, and 
action is given an enormous impetus by the enlighten-
31 ment. In many respects, the fate of contemporary 
Israel seemed to exemplify for her the tragedy and the 
possibility of these times. While she applauded the 
achievements of the pioneers (i.e., the kibbutzum and 
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The Hebrew University) as an inspiration for those who 
believed "the table" could be rebuilt, and as a symbol 
of a new kind of political action, she was an early 
critic of the manifestly political leadership of Israel, 
which blundered into the unenviable position of having 
"to choose between a homeland and a state", and then 
32 proceeded to make the wrong choice. In effect, the 
associative forms of human being do not "wither away"; 
they are systematically plundered to construct the 
foundation for a new kind of social order, where the 
"sense of connectedness" becomes, too often, a romantic 
fantasy. 
The imagery of blue, convolution, worldlessness — 
lack of connection — must be recognized as something 
more than an apt amalgamation of contemporary complaints. 
It signals a hiatus that is at once cultural, practical, 
and ontological. Approaching a critical understanding 
requires that the temptation to regard past efforts as 
unconditionally pernicious becomes integrated into our 
comprehension of the scope of the contemporary distress. 
In Chapter II, Section 2, we will argue that this is 
especially evident in education. Moreover, our review 
of proceedings of the National Herbart Society will 
demonstrate that the generation of professionals that 
established Schools of Education in America sought "a 
science of pedagogy" that would be grounded in an 
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integrated, encompassing, normative interpretation of 
culture in its dynamic inter-relationship with human 
development. That the search for "missing connections" 
was quickly abandoned as a central educational task 
testifies to the importance of focusing directly upon 
the ever-present dimensions of human relationship and 
expression, as opposed to exigencies of structural 
mediations such as schools (or, for that matter, the 
NIE), if we are to understand and re-form the content 
of our curriculum. That it has become something of a 
non-event to characterize educational research as 
largely ahistorical does not mollify the anxiety or 
the perversity of blindly participating in a form of 
activity that expresses historically specific inten­
tions which may or may not be congruent with the 
researcher's suggestions for an assessment of particular _ 
interventions or research programs. Yet, we must also 
recognize the need to break with the epistemology of 
liberal doctrine if we are to achieve meaningful 
connections. Indeed, the experience of "breaking away" 
can give us at least a visceral sense of the private 
dimension of the intentionality that has held us back 
so long. 
Returning to our "enlightened" forefathers, we can 
say that what they expressed may best be understood as 
a prepolitical understanding, which conditioned a new 
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generation; a rising bourgeoisie equipped now to make 
effective use of the techniques and arguments developed 
and prefigured by a now flourishing intelligensia. 
Indeed, what is particularly significant here is the 
convergence of the intellectual with the entrepreneur, 
the priest with the politician and the fairner with the 
statesman, a convergence which we celebrate in schools 
as part of the more general act of reverence we 
undergo each year as we continue to mystify the roles 
our Founding Fathers played in the course of human 
history. 
Thus, if we are to begin to conceptualize the 
liberal political theory as curriculum content, our 
first task must be to attempt to identify an historical 
intention: 
To tame the chaos at loose in the world, to free-
up the rising bourgeoise and the new material 
capacity, to establish a secular state which honors 
a fundamentally protestant devotion. 
Surely this analysis will not suffice, but the idea is 
that all of us must begin by seeking some understanding 
of this historical intention. For, when we accept the 
taken-for-granted definitions of our situation as our 
starting point, we can presume that we are acting to 
support and extend it. And while we will be primarily 
concerned in the latter sections with the consequences 
of this for the practice of curriculum theorizing, 
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these consequences obtain in all spheres of human 
endeavor. While we can provide a broad, literary inter­
pretation of these consequences, it must be emphasized 
that the concrete identifications of consequence can 
only be made in authentic self-and-other-reflecting 
dialogue; the genuine prescription for re-form is a 
creature of the word that is spoken. 
Secondly, to understand the liberal political 
theory as curriculum content, we must seek out the pre­
vailing methodology, the historically specific way in 
which experience translates itself into forms of 
symbolism and substance. A prevailing methodology 
answers the question "How do we go about doing what we 
do?", whether we refer to the activities of scholarly 
inquiry, civic improvement, or family living. When we 
speak of liberal political theory, we refer to the 
technique of management; a powerful technique for 
translating certain kinds of goals, values, or 
objectives into material reality, projecting man-as-
master — over political instability, unfortunate 
climatic conditions, "old fashion" modes of production 
and distribution of both knowledge and material, 
inappropriate affect, and other forms of "spurious" 
devotion. It's a technique that regards aesthetic, 
ethical and metaphysical mediations as superfluous 
diversions; a habit of mind captured by the term 
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diagnosis, for some, while good study habits, 
cleanliness, punctuality, order and predictability 
suffices for the others — and only if they can attain 
it. Herbert Marcuse called it a technological ration­
ality — a rationality of means applied to given ends — 
as he sought to understand how it is that we have become 
33 One Dimens.ional Man. In Academe, the method, as 
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Habermas has demonstrated, dissolves epistemology into 
philosophy of science, and the practical task of 
achieving "the good life" into the technical task of 
shaping the behavior of "actors", now comprehended as 
private, abstract individuals, as they come into 
relationship with the exigencies of a rapidly expanding, 
all-encompassing, institutional apparatus. Within the 
educational profession, it is the methodology that 
inspired the development of a distinctive field of 
inquiry and action that called itself "curriculum". 
Elizabeth Maccia comprehends this development as 
"praxiology", ctnd it refers to the efforts of Bobbit, 
Charters, and more recently Tyler, Taba, Stratemeyer, 
and to the debt these curriculum workers owe to the 
development of management theory, from its roots in 
scientific management to its recent flirtation with 
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the "open system". Curricular history begins as a 
sub-discipline of management theory. It focuses upon 
a rationalization of administrative plans. It raises 
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questions about the relationship between administrative 
plans, classroom events and student experiences but 
the management framework seeks not to understand but to 
control these relations.. Thirty years later, Virgil 
Herrick could look back and correctly begin his analysis 
by noting that what we mean by curriculum is "a plan for 
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a plan". Of course, it is possible for us now to trace 
the roots more precisely, and locate the "curriculum 
engineers" in particular, and the social engineers in 
general, within a methodological tradition that has its 
roots in the Newtonian enlightenment. 
Within the methodological content of liberal politi­
cal theory, there lies a special problem that may help us 
conceptualize how the whole is made present for those, of 
us who come of age in advanced industrial society. 
Roberto Unger speaks here of an anomaly; an impossible 
but somehow necessary relationship between rules and 
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values. The liberal methodology presumes that rules 
and values translate themselves through the actions of 
persons into material product in much the same manner. 
But, are not values and rules to be identified and 
defined in profoundly different ways? What really now 
is the difference between values and rules? In Section 
2, we implied that both values and rules are part of 
a larger historical development within the liberal 
epistomology, which we called the will, or desire. As 
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such, the liberal epistomology dictates that the 
meanings of both rules and values must take on much the 
same form. One might conclude from this that they ought 
to carry the same, or almost the same meanings. But, if 
values are to be understood as subjective, because as 
Locke claimed, the "mental substance" that is mind is as 
ineffable as it is universal, how then can we have just 
rules, much less fair ones? And aren't rules supposed 
to represent something very different than values? 
Rules, one might think, should derive from and signal 
what we collectively value, which is something quite 
different from an additive collection of what each of 
us finds in his/her unique situation to be important. 
In other words, to construct rules by simply quantify­
ing individual preferences, and correlating these now 
purely abstract qualities and imposing the calculation 
as a universal result backed up by the force of the 
state, would seem to ensure the violation of the 
integrity and meaning of our value commitments. But, 
where is the language (much less the structure)that 
might allow for the constant, organic translation of 
values into rules (and back again) our democracy would 
seem to require? Where, even after the struggle of a 
Dewey and those who worked steadfastly to erect his 
model, is the public dialogue — the citizenship 
democracy which virtually all liberal political 
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theorists acknowledge to be essential if we are to make 
the translation of what they call subjective values into 
objective and fair rules? 
Doesn't the hope for this translation presume the 
existence of shared meanings, at least as a possibility? 
I think we can see from this that the translations from 
the private to public attitude and back again are not an 
area that has received much consideration. The neglect 
is not benign, and the consequences as particularly 
evident in schools, where the private and public atti­
tudes constantly intermix and the ambiguity of the 
transitions are particularly debilitating. .Schools 
are public institutions; we call some of them public 
schools. But the staff is expected to intervene in 
private relationships, especially in disputes. This 
is part of the "public role". We tend to call this 
intervention into the interaction between students, 
imposing upon private encounters the arbitrary but 
authoritative rules that make them public, "discipline". 
Disciplining students is one way that the trans­
actions between private and public consciousness are 
signaled in schools. Teaching may be considered 
another (although this is not the time and place to 
attempt to decipher what the profession regards as 
teaching nowadays). In any case, the transactions are 
continuous; the patterns are, of course, historically 
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specific. To pursue this avenue of ethnographic inquiry 
would do more than provide a fascinating insight into 
contemporary definitions of what is private and what is 
public and of how the translation between value and rule 
is effected. It could locate those moments of school 
life that are particularly problematic, aud contribute 
to our critical understanding of the quality of life. 
Still, we say that peace must be established and 
maintained by rules. For the rules to be objective 
(read impersonal) and fair, they can only be established 
within a liberal framework, in one of two ways. 
Either we have a person whose political situation 
is such that she/he is presumed disinterested, whether 
this be Hobbes1 sovereign or Hegel's bureaucrat, 
jurists that are appointed for life (or, in the minds 
of many of last generation of Americans, a millionaire 
such as Rockefeller or an "expert" such as Kissinger) 
or by a vote coupled with a rigorous search for a 
powerfully motivating apparatus for developing and 
articulating issues -- a search that must extend to 
all sectors of society. In both cases, the epistemolo-
gical problems are obscured. From whence come the 
standards? Of what substance or content is the 
"disinterested interest"? What is conveyed when the 
"issue articulation apparatus" comes up against a 
consciousness that responds, in countless ways, "no, I 
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prefer not"? By this we do not refer specifically to the 
percentage of voter turnout in elections, but to over­
whelming apathy that we bring to our private 
experiencing, to all those who have chosen to opt out 
of life itself, to the uncountable thousands that do 
not show up in the United States Census, and to the 
literally millions whose bodily presence belies an 
ontological absence. 
And so, liberal political theory, as curriculum 
content, makes itself present to us fractured, scarred, 
flawed, always ambiguous. Whether we speak of the power 
relationships in a classroom, or the social relation­
ships that construct the knowledge which forms its 
context, for most Americans, young and old, the world 
fades into an ever-lighter shade of pale. Or, as one 
of my students on the south side of Chicago so power­
fully expressed it to me one rainy Friday afternoon: 
"As fast as I can figure out where it's at, they've 
moved it." 
Finally, liberal political theory as curriculum 
content is context. It i_s the schools wherein we 
receive instruction, it ijs the offices, the factories, 
the shops where we hold down jobs, it is the homes, 
the appartments, the condominiums where we rest, and 
perchance, we play. Of course, the context 
encompasses more than the architecture. It refers 
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simultaneously to the existential experience of persons 
as they come up against the structures of their sociality, 
and the culturally and politically assembled forms of 
knowledge and practice which mediate the encounter — 
whether we attend to it with an eye towards the intra-
personal, the inter-personal, or the socio-political, 
dimension of curriculum content. 
Reference to dimensions of curriculum content 
could, I suspect, offer the curriculum theorist access 
to a syntax that is not wholly a prisoner of liberal 
doctrine. It has served here as a picturing model that 
has helped me to maintain the tension between liberal 
doctrine as curriculum content and curriculum content 
per se. To speak of intrapersonal, interpersonal, 
and socio-political dimensions of curriculum content 
is to employ a syntax that does not arbitrarily define 
what is or can be our curriculum content, how it is 
or can be made present, and where it is or can be 
located, as separate problems, and thus has some 
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potential for opening up new dimensions of theory and 
practice. While it is not rny intention here to develop 
this mental picture into a fully articulate "curriculum 
theory", I must do more than merely allude to it if I 
am to share with you my reflections upon the context 
we have developed in this chapter. Perhaps this 
re-presentation can help: 
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Our critique of liberal doctrine as curriculum 
content reveals three interrelated, contiguous 
dimensions which cut across particular institu­
tional settings and inhere in each as "what we 
come up, against in life". 
THE INTRAPERSONAL The communicative relations 
DIMENSION OF between the person and his/ 
CURRICULUM CONTENT her conscj.ousness in a 
distorted inn^r space. 
THE INTERPERSONAL The private relationships 
DIMENSION OF that occur when persons 
CURRICULUM CONTENT come up against other 
persons in a distorted 
social space. 
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL The pattern of communicative 
DIMENSION OF relations that construct an 
CURRICULUM CONTENT institutional life-world in 
a distorted public space. 
Based upon our discussion thus far, we can conclude 
that liberal doctrine can help us to make sense of a 
pervasive, taken-for-granted immersion in the inter­
personal dimension which leads us to construct 
environments that limit access to inner spaces, masks 
the impact of institutional communications, and diverts 
the potentialities of collective effort. Chapter II 
will survey the consequences of this for the practice of 
curriculum theorizing. 
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CHAPTER II 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM THEORIZING 
The Institution of Education, as the Methodology of 
Liberal Doctrine: A Perspective on the 
Curriculum Theorist's Situation 
Decker Walker began his recent reconsideration of 
the 26th NSSE Yearbook (a recognized "classic in the 
field" devoted to the question "What should we teach in 
schools?") and the practice of curriculum theory by 
summoning the imagery of Robert Frost who saw the man 
standing in the hay he was trying to lift; straining to 
lift himself.''" I hope that having passed through 
Chapter I, the image you retain is somewhat more 
complete. We see the "hay" — liberal doctrine as 
curriculum content. Perhaps we have achieved some under­
standing of how it is that while we stand in it, we 
cannot lift it; nor can we Mft ourselves. Indeed, the 
tragedy discloses itself when we come to truly under­
stand ourselves as haymakers; when we understand how 
our activity brings forth what we do not want, and 
mires us higher and deeper as we strain all the more 
intensely. For those who do not, or prefer not to 
understand the consequences of their practice, thinking 
perhaps that they can submit in comfort, there is the 
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eerie world of disassociation. Think of the man who, 
trying to survive in his own mind, decided to take a 
canoe trip down the river. He gets his canoe into the 
water, drops his paddle down, and, lo and behold,there 
is no connection! No matter which way he holds or 
strokes it, there is no movement — the paddle appears 
to come up against nothing. Suddenly, the thought 
occurs to him that perhaps he does not have a paddle. 
"How do I know I have a paddle in the water?", he 
asks, and the regressive logic begins. For if he 
cannot prove the existence of his paddle, what then 
of the canoe, or the body that occupies it? And so 
it is that "the search for the paddle" becomes an 
increasingly desperate occupation. 
Here in Chapter II, we will concern ourselves 
with exploring the meaning of this situation for the 
practice of curriculum theorizing. The title of this 
section suggests the avenue of approach that we shall 
adopt to begin to connect the all-encompassing frame­
work of Chapter I to a more particular concern for the 
field. 
When I suggest that we can understand the 
Institution of Education as the methodology of liberal 
doctrine, I mean this in three ways. First, while the 
profession cannot as yet render anything like a 
complete answer to the question "What do schools 
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teach?", to say that schools intend to teach the liberal 
methodology to the young cannot be very far from the 
truth of the matter, whether we examine the explicitly 
valued intentions, or the implicit, latent, or hidden 
ones. Second, the method can locate for us the organiz­
ing principles that govern the whole of this institu­
tional life — its formative structure. Finally, the 
values that are articulated by those who live and work 
within the institution become the expressions of the 
method, in the sense that the educator's talk, even 
his/her critical talk, functions to legitimize the 
whole affair. In other words, we will begin by 
entertaining the idea that the methodology of liberal 
doctrine functions via the Institutions of Education 
(broadly conceived) to reproduce the form of life we 
described in Chapter I. 
For example, in Section 2 of Chapter I, we saw 
that the Newtonian model has generated a view of 
knowledge emphasizing the connection of mind to matter 
in the narrow view that our bodies are in a purely 
abstract, public Newtonian space. We've seen in 
Section 2 of Chapter I that in real life this 
view of knowledge is inexorably intertwined with a 
psychological and political situation that presents us 
with a given world. Let us bracket, for the moment, 
these connections. In other words, although liberal 
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method represents, in its fullest development, the 
moving force of an actual circumstance, if we focus 
strictly upon its intellectual component, the liberal 
methodology can be reduced to an empirical-analytic 
research program. 
Marshall Gordon calls this the "Hypotlietical-
2 deductive Model of Inquiry". This characterization 
emphasizes the idea that the deductive logic which 
moves down — begins with a hypothesis; a creative, 
personally liberative act of insight, but continues 
from there along the kind of deterministic path we 
associate with a Newtonian mechanics. Once the machine 
gets rolling, the deductive steps dovm the latter of 
knowledge attain a kind of privileged, logical status. 
The memory of the distinctly human insight that 
created and shared this "line of inguiry" as an ex­
perience is insulated from those who "catch the ring 
in midflight". This is because the inquiry model is 
designed to present only the results -- conclusions as 
scientific products -- and thus shares with all the 
dimensions of the liberal methodology, and with its 
"congealed actuality", the disposition to regard as 
superfluous those mediations — ethical, aesthetic, 
metaphysical — which might mitigate against a con­
temporary common sense that believes "the shortest 
distance between two points is a straight line". And, 
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of course these conclusions are expressed in the 
seemingly objective, impersonal language of the Newtonian 
public space; they are communiques. As well, at each 
step down the deductive series, the communique contains 
smaller bits of information. In other words, since (as 
we have noted) the amount of information in a "bit" 
varies proportionately with its unexpectedness, "what 
comes down" is very boring. 
And so it is that this kind of knowledge presents 
itself to educators, who in turn, present it to the 
young, as if it were a "given thing". This does not 
mean there is no room for discussion. Certainly there 
is discussion, and we will surely return to this aspect 
of school practice in a moment. For now, we need to 
see that the boundaries of the discussion that occurs 
are actually closed. The teachers cannot know them, 
indeed, even curriculum specialists and many theorists 
regard themselves not as creators of knowledge, but 
as persons who utilize knowledge and build "learning 
environments" for the young. 
Extending this very simplified picture, we see the 
chain of command that leads down from the university-
based curriculum person, to the subject matter 
specialist, to the teacher, enters into the middle of 
the descending ladder of knowledge, both bureaucrati-
cally and historically, and extends to the child, who 
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is at the bottom. Each link on the chain is assigned 
its task, although the persons involved cannot know, 
concretely, just what the task is as the fundamental 
and sustaining logic of the assignment was derived 
"from above". Depending upon the institutional style, 
the person more or less makes his/her own task up 
based upon the knowledge available to him/her, and 
takes orders that neither she/he nor the "instructor" 
are in a position to truly justify. As Michael Apple 
and Nancy King have shown, children learn at a very 
early cige to distinguish between explicitly assigned 
tasks, and tasks they assign themselves, (very signi­
ficantly, these tasks are also consistent with the 
3 "instructions"), as, respectively, "work" and "play". 
Indeed, they argue that in an important sense this is 
what kindergartners are taught. For the adult, we 
might say that this distinction comes to be redefined 
as one between "job" and "work". However, to develop 
this image further is not really germane here, rather, 
we might do better to conclude this very limited 
hermeneutic with a more comprehensive picture, one 
that draws upon both the latent and manifest intention-
ality to help us see the liberal methodology at work in 
a particular way. (Recall th§ intention at this stage 
is primarily to lend a measure of plausibility to our 
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bold assertions about the relationship between liberal 
methodology and the institution of education.) 
Let us, then, reconsider the case of the young 
child, and suppose that she/he is about to encounter 
his/her first real reading lesson. It is mid-morning, 
and though the constitutive structure of <_he inter­
personal environment on this day may well be of the sort 
that King and Apple suggest, manifestly, the child 
seems "free" to paint his/her sun yellow, blue, or 
grey; to walk around the room pretty much as she/he 
pleases, to imagine the blocks in this corner of the 
room are really spaceships, or look through the card­
board kaleidoscope in that corner, and feel somehow 
muscially intuned — perhaps with his/her favorite 
Super-Hero. Suddenly, everything changes. Out of the 
corner of his/her eye, the child encounters the glance 
of the adult, let us say twenty feet away. The adult 
is somehow not the same person she/he was only moments 
ago. Perhaps the adult has a book in his/her hand, 
perhaps not — but what we are witnessing here is the 
child-as-student, coming up against the adult-as-
teacher, who has decided it is time for the child to 
have his/her first reading lesson. 
To say that the lesson must take place in the 
Newtonian public world is simply to acknowledge that 
the printed messages of the book organize themselves on 
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a straight line, must be read "one way" (from left to 
right), and like riding a bicycle or driving a car, 
there is a certain edge to the encoding and decoding 
of printed messages that lacks the intuitive quality 
of coming to speak, or to walk, to paint, etc. Let 
us say this certain quality of attentiveness must be 
"taught". By this, we simply mean that the adult must 
invite the child to join him/her in the public space. 
But, unlike the bike or the car, the printed message 
is literally that which carries the historicity of 
human kind. This moment we are witnessing, then, can 
be seen as quasi-archetypical. It is probably the 
closest we come in America to a cultural initiation 
rite — it is when the past is made present for the 
future. 
For our purposes here, it is crucial to understand 
that, from the perspective of the "School System", what 
occasions the "need" for this encounter, indeed what 
comes to define it, (and as an encounter, never a 
meeting) is that quality of the reading experience that 
is skill — the technical edge. Here "the shortest 
distance between two lines", the perversely common 
sense that is liberal method, directs our attention 
to the superficial edge of a truly profound, rooted 
experience, and tends to hold it there, both despite 
and because of our collective concern for the 
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experience. In the public schools, what we explicitly 
teach, by and large, and almost always test for and 
group in terms of, is the ability to decode and encode 
printed messages. This is the necessary but not 
sufficient condition for engaging the reading experi­
ence, but the necessary and sufficient condition for 
achieving the rite of passage into a public world 
whose essential qualities are delimited by the liberal 
doctrine. This encounter, taken as interpersonal 
content, is the most "perfect" example I know of the 
liberal methodology at work, with the implications 
(indeed the meaning) hidden by the smooth veneer of 
rationality, and with the essentially antiseptic 
quality that Rawls prefigures very much .in evidence. 
This is one way to begin to seek an understanding of 
how it is that the public world which is made present 
for the young, as they come up against it, is the 
public world of liberal doctrine. 
Moreover, our interpretation can be profitably 
extended to account for the phenomenon of "back to 
basics" and the corresponding fascination with the 
language of competency and accountability. Here the 
common sense of public opinion seems to present 
us with the affect of negation in the form of an 
insistence upon the status quo. That is to say, our 
critique of liberal political theory has outlined how 
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the dominant structures and values condition popular 
discontent, and transform it into what is effectively a 
prescription for consolidating the perceived injustice. 
While it may be tempting to respond by asking "where 
did the basics go?", and in so doing, recognize that 
despite the progressive rhetoric for which the 
profession is famous, the facile assimilation of the 
person into the culture has been the quintessential 
activity of schooling, this sort of response is 
insufficient. On the one hand, it justifies the kind 
of righteous attitude that is the true mark of the 
parish, who looks with contempt upon the unmediated 
expressions of anger, resentment, and alienation on 
the part of the people, and finds his own distruct 
confirmed when they turn, against his cherished vision, 
and on the other hand, it offers the sympathetic 
practitioner, who may desperately believe that she/he 
has more to offer than yesterday's medicine repackaged 
as today's technology, little more than a prescription 
for anguish and resignation. What I am suggesting is 
that the failure of the educational fraternity to seize 
upon the underlying sense of betrayal as an unprece­
dented opportunity to demystify the reality of 
schooling and build a new vision that could effectively 
compete with the techno-ethic of the liberal method 
can only be fully understood as a reflection of the 
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•ervasive immersion in the Inter-personal Dimension. 
• .utonio Gramsci' s interpretation is instructive: 
The individual expects the organism to act, even 
if he does not do anything himself, and does not 
reflect that precisely because his attitude is 
widespread, the organism is necessarily inopera­
tive. Furthermore, it should be recognized that, 
since a deterministic and mechanical conception 
of history is very widespread . . .each 
individual, seeing that despite his non-interven­
tion something still does happen, tends to think 
that there indeed exists, over and above 
individuals, a phantasmagorical being, the 
abstraction of the collective organism, a kind of 
autonomous divinity, which does not think with 
any concrete brain but still thinks, etc.'* 
With this in mind, I ask you to join me in 
rethinking through the situation of the educational 
theorist in America. Sometimes it is the obvious that 
is most important. What is most obvious about the 
theorist's situation is its infancy. There are probably 
still those among us whose teacher's teachers were 
among the first to graduate from schools of education 
in America, and from the beginning there has been the 
overwhelming expectation, which persists today, that 
somehow his/her activity would, could, or should 
directly change the school. While I have been asked 
how my activity would (could or should, etc.) change 
the schools, on countless occasions and in countless 
ways, and I make it a practice to try to snatch a 
few tense moments to clarify the question in what is 
nearly always a perverse interchange, I genuinely 
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end up, having assured myself I understand the 
questioners' use of language, thoroughly convinced there 
must be some mistake. 
The way the question is usually put situates it in 
Harry S. Broudy's Real World of the Public Schools. Let 
me quote from one of his more trenchant images: 
Imagine, if you will, an army of about 4 6 million 
troops engaged in a campaign under the direction 
of about 2 million officers. Each of the 
soldiers serve anywhere from 8 to 12 years in the 
army, so that there is a constant replacement of 
veterans by recruits. On a smaller scale, there 
is a constant renewal of the officers. The 
campaign plans were drawn and revised little by 
little. Imagine now what it would take to alter 
the campaign or the movement of the army in a 
significant way. 
Moreover, the presumption is that the theorist is a 
general in this army? the questioner really wants the 
theorist to unveil his battle plans. The interpersonal 
conception of the problem is as apparent as it is 
impossible, but it persists nonetheless, with several 
nontrivial consequences. 
First, a strategic concern for the survival of the 
field comes to dominate the theorist's attention, as 
individuals continue to float proposals which must 
somehow seem to offer the hope of meeting the impossible 
expectations in order to achieve public support, while 
at the same time offer the field and its members a 
legitimate avenue for development. As the story of the 
man in the canoe suggests, the "search for the paddle" 
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leaves the canoe increasingly at the mercy of the water's 
current. The field seems unable to really get behind 
and pursue any of the projected research programs, since 
none of them can satisfy the contradictory structural, 
personal, and intellectual demands. It would be silly 
to conclude from this that curriculum theorists are 
especially weak or short sighted. Rather, we might 
suggest that they have chosen an avenue of pursuit 
where the anguish of the liberal psychology is parti­
cularly apparent. That their discourse has been 
centered by the question "What should be taught in 
schools?" does not mean the research has all been 
unabashedly prescriptive in its style, since there are a 
variety of indirect ways of responding to the concern 
for content as it is usually defined. But it does mean, 
as an interpersonal matter, that the discussion begins 
within the institutional context of the liberal 
doctrine, and it begins as a problem of value. The 
predicament of (or shall we say the pretension to) 
objectivity, which all university professors must some­
how confront, becomes debilitating for the curriculum 
theorist who is to regard his work as valuable, but not 
because she/he believes in it. The theorist who finds 
it impossible to establish a direct, positive relation­
ship between his/her activity and school practice 
writ large and for this reason judges his/her field 
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moribund and impotent, yet chooses to continue the 
conversation, must make that choice on the basis of 
another sort of knowledge which tells him/her "yes, 
this is important". But of this kind of knowledge, 
she/he has difficulty speaking. 
Second, the practitioner is left to pursue his/her 
craft without benefit of a reasonably well articulated, 
ethically compelling, politically viable framework for 
an evolving theory of practice and is often without the 
time or disposition to develop his/her own, or even 
recognize what is missing. Allegiance to code words 
such as competence, openness, progressive, achievement, 
effectiveness, (and their requisite techniques) circum­
scribe the avenues to substantial reflection, and the 
day-to-day demands of classroom teaching tend to leave 
even these attenuated directions unpursued. The 
committed practitioner reasons, understandably, that 
she/he can't possibly understand the totality of his/her 
situation, but must do what she/he can to teach what 
must be taught. If the school environment is too 
distorted to be comprehensible, if it becomes impossible 
to join with students in critically reflecting upon it 
and drawing upon their relationship with this world as 
the instructional ground, the teacher must provide 
another. But while simulations, movies, roleplays, 
etc., may seem to work, the problems of relating to 
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what has transpired gets worse.. Potentially important 
insights, events, and meetings become relegated to the 
world of the hypothetical and the somewhere else, and 
do not provide the impetus to clarify, investigate, or 
challenge actual relationships. Just as the liberal 
political theory posits a simplified situation that 
is manageable but neglects to comprehend the ongoing 
consequences of imposing this systematically distorted 
situation upon the world, the practitioners' addiction 
to gimmickery and technique conceals more than it 
reveals. "Making hay" is more than the idle pastime of 
populist demagoues, it is the occupation of committed, 
frustrated people everywhere. 
Having situated the liberal methodology in the con­
text of The Institution of Education, and re-introduced 
some of the more graphic psychological and political 
connective tissue, let us draw upon the whole of Chapter 
I to conclude this interpretation of the theorists' 
predicament. 
In Chapter I, we were able to move from liberal 
psychological theory to liberal political theory, and 
from historical intention to method, and finally to 
context. The path was not easy, but the connection was 
there and some understandings were achieved. Recognising 
The institution of education as the methodology of 
liberal doctrine leads us to grasp how the theorist, as 
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a creature of this method, seeks to comprehend the 
consequences of his/her activity. On the one hand, our 
discussion of liberal doctrine as curriculum content 
establishes this relationship for us — one hand feeds 
the other, so to speak. One way to reconstruct this 
for our purposes here would be to say that the method 
builds the context, which in turn expresses the 
historical intention. Yet, we see as well that this 
connection is literally a blur for those who attempt to 
make it with respect to their own practice. The pre­
sumption that curriculum content is the response to the 
question "What do we teach in schools?", as opposed to 
"What do we come up against in life?", indicates that 
this activity begins within the institutional context 
of liberal doctrine, a house of mirrors from which it 
is difficult to escape. Our discussion of the phenomenon 
of institutional communications showed us how the 
surface aesthetic of the institution presents what we 
called a "form" that can project the appearance of 
meaningful, legitimate activity for those who "take the 
bait", and our interpretation of the reading experience 
indicates that this form is nothing more than the 
technical edge of potentially profound, human experience. 
However, access to substansive dimensions are blocked by 
the maddeningly vague opacity of a public world that 
forces us back into a private, interpersonal world view 
112 
through which the intentionality of the liberal doctrine 
remains unchallenged. As the rationalization of this 
institutional life-form continues, and the odious conse­
quences become more apparent, the need for theory 
becomes great, while the task of achieving it becomes 
more difficult. 
On the Avenues of Approach 
In Chapter I, we pointed towards three interrelated, 
contiguous dimensions of curriculum content whose 
significance remains hidden by our immersion in liberal 
doctrine. In Section 1 of this chapter, we were able to 
offer a suggestive interpretation of the consequences of 
this predicament for the contemporary curriculum 
theorist. Here in Section 2, we turn our attention to 
an analogous attempt to portray the status of his theory. 
What follows should not be confused with a survey of the 
literature. The two texts I have chosen to focus upon 
are neither popular nor especially representative of 
e 
what is being done by university-based theorists in 
North America today. However, they strike me as the 
best of their genre. Undeniably impressive achievements 
in their own right, they hold promise to establish, upon 
our critical scrutiny, the necessity for reconceptuali-
zing curriculum content. 
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At first glance, the proceedings of the National 
Herbart Society (1895-8) might seem a most unlikely place 
to look for help in clarifying the contemporary 
problematic. Yet, when we reflect that the major con­
tributors to this text — The MacMurrays, C. C. Van 
Liew, Charles DeGarmo, John Dewey — constitute "the 
first family" of university-based educational profession­
als in America, and that they maintained an explicit 
focus upon the question President DeGarmo posed in the 
1st Yearbook's "Opening Remarks" (1895) — "T'fliat should 
the Public Schools teach?";6 our choice becomes less 
surprising. But it is their avenue of approach to this 
problem that establishes the relevance of their inquiry 
to this investigation. The Herbart.ians evidenced no 
ambivalence in their belief that the problem could and 
should be approached theoretically. They wanted to 
develop appropriate principles for determining the mutual 
7 interrelation of the course of study. That is, to say, 
theirs was not (for the years 189 5-8) simply a search 
for ways to mold the disparate ideas, values, or 
interests of the educational constituency into a 
politically viable consensus that could release schools 
from previous constraints on what could be taught. As 
the first generation of university-based professionals, 
they seemed to have assumed that the task of identifying 
"scientific" principles had intrinsic practical rele­
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vance. What I wish to suggest here is that the example 
of the Herbartians has potential for signifying the 
possibilities and limitations of what curriculum 
theorizing can achieve within the liberal constellation. 
Perhaps, their position as trailblazers meant that 
they could simply assume the role of generals in the 
sense we have discussed, .in any case, in this hothouse 
of illusion, the discussions that are recorded in the 
early yearbooks coalesce to form a coherent body of 
reflection that we can respond to. 
We might begin by recognizing that the special 
language which was developed to form the nucleus of the 
hoped for science of pedagogy "is best expressed by the 
8 word relations" (Charles MacMurray's italics). ' In this 
sense, the Ilerbartian quest is not-unlike our own. 
However, our critique of liberal doctrine allows us to 
anticipate that these relations would not be the actual, 
distorted relations of the world we live through 
together. Rather, the Herbartians sought to grasp as 
harmonious the relationships within and between three 
ideational spheres: the cultural development of 
Species Man, the valued forms of social character, and 
the development of individual mental capacity. Pre­
sumably then, the instructional program would be able 
to embody and impose this intellectual harmony upon the 
child's school environment. 
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This leaves us with a remarkably apropos Conception 
of the task of the theorist. When approaching the 
course of study, Herbartians were willing to tolerate 
clear intellectual distinctions, but not task-oriented 
practical ones, between developing its objective, 
logical relations, and showing how, in principle, these 
relations become a part of the "apperceptive mass" of 
8 persons. Here, I believe we can locate an enduring 
strength, because whether we see our challenge as one 
of prefiguring the course of study out of our ideational 
reflection and moral deliberation, or responding in re­
creative ways to the course of study "in place", a 
recognition that the concern for the course of study 
must extend to both structural and phenomenological 
relations is central. But while it remains possible, 
given the continuing survival of the norms of academic 
freedom, to explore these relations on a purely 
ideational level, the limits of liberal doctrine would 
have to be surmounted for these relations to be 
recognized as practical ones. 
Thus, if we made a "Herbartian approach" through 
these spheres of reflection beginning with the logical 
relations in and of a course of study as proposed, we 
might choose to select a subject, element, motif, or 
generic relationship first and build the rest from or 
around it (this was called an "objective concentration"), 
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or we might think more relationally (today we might say 
"ecologically") about the whole affair, and seek to 
grasp possibilities for "objective co-ordination", but 
we could not just stop their and say. we had solved the 
problem. As Frank MacMurray put it "the fact is that 
he has only just, reached it, it began where he left 
off . . . the (objective) relations have always 
actually existed as they do now, but children have not 
9 discovered them. . In effect, one must have in 
mind simultaneously the logical relations between and 
among the elements of the course of study and the 
psychological relations that exist both in the child 
and in its relations with this content (this was 
signified by the language of "apperceptive mass"). It 
is in each of these aspects and in its entirety that 
one was to strive for unity, that is to say, actual 
concentration or correlation. 
In other words, the Herbartians recognized that the 
course of study only makes yense to the extent that it 
makes sense as an apperceptive unity. However, instead 
of asking as we have in this Dissertation "HOW is it 
that the course of study does not make sense?", locating 
this as a concrete historical circumstance, setting our 
sights upon achieving conditions where we might, as 
liberated autonomous adults, "make sense together" and 
extend a coherent invitation to the new-born in all of 
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us, the Herbartians sought what C. C, Van Liew called 
a "paramount regularitive principle""^ that could 
contemplate the three spheres of ideational reflection 
as an integrated, vital process. This paramount 
regularitive principle, commonly known as the cultural 
epoch hypothesis claims: 
.. a parallelism of the psychical development 
lying back of the .specific products which the 
race has offered in its history, on the one 
hand, and the manifestation of the growth 
of the cliild on the other. Hence while it 
claims that the boy, for instance, has and 
evinces at certain stages of his development 
traits that, in given enrvironments, have 
produced in the history of the race, say, 
the bandit, the cowboy (in the less 
desirable sense) or the pirate; it by no means 
claims what would be a foolish trifling with 
the idea of education, that every boy should 
be a pirate or bandit to be rightly developed. 
But it would claim that these same instincts, 
the source of wholesome as well as degenerate 
developments, should be seized and rightly 
utilized at the height of their development. 
It would seek to determine what stages have 
been essential to the development of the 
race; it would eliminate those that have 
been non-essential, and it would present, in 
the light of the ethical aim of education, 
that material of culture which is the product... 
of the great movements of human development. 
But we do not have to concern ourselves with 
assessing the validity of this "hypothesis" to recog­
nize a very important precedent for our work. A 
coherent body of prescriptive theory simply requires 
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recourse to some integrating conception as the arbiter 
for value disputes. The Herbartians, as we see here, 
held that culture locates the ground for any such arbi­
tration. And while the image of human development may 
seem crude to us, the interpretation of culture still 
holds a certain timeliness. Indeed, it is the epitome 
of the liberal faith in progress and human purpose: 
Van Liew's quote from Rein is paradigmatic. 
Culture comprehends the entire sphere of human 
labor, everything that man has ever felt, 
experienced, thought out, and attempted in the 
fields of either humanistic effort or natural 
science — an immense treasure, which men 
have thus far amassed, and which, day by day, 
they set about increasing unto infinity in 
order constantly to enhance their power 
over the life of Man and Nature. Into this 
powerful stream, which taken at its depth, 
reveals but a single movement, while on its 
surface, the most varied currents rush side 
by side, often begetting eddy and whirlpool 
or crowding one another, — into this 
stream is placed the unfolding human being 
with the hard requirement of making its 
power his own that he may in turn contribute 
to the power of the whole. 
It's a wonderful story,„though hardly connected in 
a critical way with the lived experience of schooled 
life. But it served the Herbartian well in articulating 
his values, justifying them by "the demands of culture", 
expressing them in the slogan "the aim of education is 
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13 the development of character", guiding him to consider 
"which stages in the development of the race are 
14 essential", and "what cultural intentions and forms" 
15 (Dewey) or "material products" (McMurray) best express 
these stages. Here was a discourse that could stretch 
from the elementary to the esoteric at the drop of a 
hat, but never lose its balance. For example, when 
Colonel Parker with the support of Professor Jackman 
(neither of whom could be considered Herbartians in 
terms of our interpretation) pressed the view in open 
discussion that nature study understood as ethnology, 
as opposed to geography, history or literature (the 
Herbartian favorites) should be central; he asserted 
that "ethnology is the central study . . . (in that) 
history is a report of ethnology"."1"^ Only later did the 
polemics begin: "Through history and literature, the 
child can be adjusted to the Society, State, and 
Government; through the proper study of nature he can 
17 only be adjusted to the truth of God". The point is 
that despite the lively polemic that ensured, with 
speakers interrupting each other and appealing to every 
kind of argument they could think of, the expectation 
is that the ultimate way you would move a Herbartian 
away from geography, literature and history as the 
central foci was to question his interpretation of the 
development of culture, or his assumption that the 
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discourse should move from cultural (and not some 
transcendental commitment) to course of study (via the 
child). I am convinced that a fair reading of the 
debate cannot help but confirm the impression that the 
Parker proposal was considered along the lines that 
President DeGarmo suggested that it be considered; as 
presenting as an alternative principle to guide 
reflection a "philosophical conception of energy working 
18 through matter in accordance with universal lav/" 
(1895). Accordingly, it was rejected by the Ilerbar-
tians, and indeed this decision has stuck, because it 
was felt to be a moral imperative that the educational 
profession ground its practice within the limit 
situation that culture provides. 
That the Herbartians developed an elegant avenue 
of contemplation is not be be denied. As well, we 
have attempted to recognize in our interpretation a 
number of procedures that make good sense for anyone 
constructing school curricula to consider. But still 
the question remains, if the course of study does not 
make sense, and if we mean by this the course of study 
that is actually lived and experienced by real concrete 
persons, how is this to be understood and overcome? Is 
this to be understood as a problem that is endemic to 
schools, and are schools the only context to which "the 
course of study" is to refer? What gave the Herbartian 
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the idea that pure, rarefied, nondistorted materials or 
forms of culture were available to be transported to the 
schools, or that the schools were like a black box into 
which these embodied meanings could be poured? While 
Herbartian reflection was concerned with more than the 
psychology of learning, we that they did not really 
explore what we have called the dimensions of curriculum 
content much less critique them, but presumed that they 
could be located in abstract ideational space and simply 
appropriated for use in the schools. In the process, 
they misunderstood the character of curriculum content 
and schools, accepting the tenor of their times 
uncritically. However, they leave behind a body of 
reflection that captures, albeit purely in that reflec­
tion, something of the artfulness of the curriculum 
enterprise; the necessity of attending simultaneously 
to the structural and phenomenological realm. Given 
our discussion in Chapter I, it should not be surprising 
that, over time, even this sense of artfulness, this 
commitment to an integrating intelligence, becomes the 
exception and not the rule in theoretical attempts 
to respond to the question "What should we teach in 
schools?". 
The text I have chosen to scrutinize in this 
regard comes from Paul H. Hirst, of the University of 
Cambridge. It is a collection of essays entitled 
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19 Knowledge and the Curriculum. While it should be 
possible, for present purposes, to select any contem­
porary piece that organizes itself as a theoretical 
response to the question "What shall we teach in 
school?", the virtue of this particular selection lies 
in the author's unquestionable ability to argue his 
position forcefully, systematically and thoroughly. 
What we will be doing here is putting Hirst's thought up 
against both the Herbartians and the understandings we 
have achieved in this study. This procedure is meant to 
call attention to my view that we have a rather clear 
choice in curriculum theory. Either we retain the 
present conceptualization of content, in which case the 
Herbartian heritage can serve as a model for our work, 
as the breath of its intellectual commitment remains 
unmatched, or we can decide that the direction of our 
work lies in the reconceptualization I have tried to 
point towards. 
Let us begin by summarizing the opening points that 
Hirst organized in his first essay, constructed as a 
kind of introduction to the collection: 
1. Curriculum means a program of activities 
designed so that pupils will attain by 
learning certain specifiable ends or 
obj ectives. 
2. All knowledge is differentiated into a 
limited number of logically distinct forms 
or disciplines . . . there is simply no 
such thing as knowledge which is not 
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locatable within some such organization, and 
what that location is is not a matter of 
choice or decision. 
3. While the social organization of the school 
and the pattern of its general life both in 
and out of class need to be seen as the 
vehicles of learning they truly are . . . 
only the most elementary achievements are 
articulated in the situations encountered 
in everyday social lives and . . . the more 
sophisticated forms are part of extremely 
complex rule-governed structures of thought 
and practice. 
We have here a rather pervasive set of starting 
points, although the precision with which they are arti­
culated is exceptional. From the Herbartian frame of 
reference, the initial approach to critique would be to 
question whether Hirst v/as interested in more than the 
"objective" aspects of the correlation-concentration 
problematic. I base this view on more than imagination, 
as this was the tack they took in rejecting W. T. 
Harris' Committee of 15 Report of 1895 which argued that 
the valued cultural heritage organizes itself into five 
categories of knowledge. While the Herbartians had no 
quarrel with this sort of philosophizing per se, they 
argued that we cannot understand either the elementary 
or more complicated form.s as separate from the student-
life to which they must ultimately be related. Thus 
their example would compel us to look beyond the formal, 
technical edge of human activity. Hirst does not. As 
well, the Herbartians would remind us to pay attention 
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to the axiological structure that Hirst develops; the 
pattern of valuing that grounds his exposition at each 
step and in its entirity. As well, we can see that both 
the Herbartians and Hirst hold that the everyday-life 
situations in school and presumably elsewhere do not 
carry with them the potential to encounter a meaningful 
course of study, but they do not inquire further into 
this problematic. In effect, we are to build out of 
these situations something meaningful and coherent 
without attempting to understand the situation itself, 
thus neglecting to concern ourselves with the part we 
play in it. 
These elements of Hirst's thought make themselves 
present for us in his famous essay "Liberal Education 
and the Nature of Knowledge", but only if we are prepared 
to negotiate the complex language systems he is working 
through. The situation is forced upon us, because his 
understanding of the forms of knowledge, the way he 
connects these forms to "the curriculum", and the value 
frame that sustains the enterprise are "all of a piece", 
and that which they are a piece of is crucial to under­
stand. There is, first-off, a decidedly paradigmatic 
series of reflections that lead us from the three simple 
starting points towards what should be by now a rather 
familiar "liberal" view of the most fundamental 
questions man can ask of himself, his neighbor, and his 
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world, which it is Hirst's special talent to make 
fairly clear for us. And there is also to be found and 
charted the relationship between his thought and the 
Herbartians, along the lines we have indicated. 
In "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge", 
Hirst has taken the platonic idea of education (which 
he also labels liberal, but the term means something 
very different in this context) stripped of its meta­
physics, ethics and aesthetics, as the starting point 
for a contemporary conception of liberal education 
(liberal now in a sense that is consistent with our 
treatment). In this sense, Hirst's argument recapit­
ulates the central dynamic we have been concerned with. 
VJe see that Plato understood the pursuit of knowledge 
as THE ultimate WAY; it locates for man the good, the 
true and the beautiful. One need not be .concerned 
with the relationship between knowledge, course of 
study, and person; in coming to know we are assured of 
an intuitive harmony that .inheres in its pursuit, 
transcending all such distinctions or distortions. In 
other words, Hirst takes the Greek experience as a 
kind of Garden of Eden, and draws the following con­
clusion : 
. . . thus, there has arisen the demand for an 
education whose definition and justification 
are based on the nature and significance of 
126 
knowledge itself, and not on the predilictions of 
pupils, the demands of society or the whims of 
politicians.21 
But, once the vision, the music, and the force of 
mind that sustained this promise has been lost, is it 
responsible to accept a demand for an educational 
experience that is not "contaminated" with the world 
we live through together? What, then, would we mean 
by knowledge, and how, outside the kingdom of the 
forms, or some such essential unity, are we to 
establish this meaning? Without hope for the intuitive 
harmony of the aethetic quest, what now are we to make 
of the very real distortions between and among the 
"stuff of the curriculum", and what are the consequences 
for our work? Let us listen once again to Hirst: 
What is being suggested, rather, is that the 
"harmony" (his quotes). . .is a matter of the 
logical relationship between the concept of 
mind and the concept of knowledge. . .Further, 
whatever private forms of awareness there may 
be, it is by means of symbols, particularly in 
language, that conceptual articulation becomes 
objectified, for the symbols give public 
embodiment to the concepts. 
We see that while the Herbartians opted for a lush 
cultural harmony that could be found at the bottom of 
the stream of history man has created, as this history 
is recapulated by the new-born, Hirst's harmony belongs 
to the empty, abstract world of Newtonian "public 
space". While the Herbartians saw the demand for liberal 
education in terms of the development of socially valued 
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character, without questioning what kind of character 
that would turn out to be, Hirst sees it in the 
development .of a pattern of logic that has no ethical 
character whatsoever. Knowledge then, for Hirst, is a 
socially constructed "objectivity" that we locate and 
verify by performing logical operations upon its 
manifestation — language. His investigation of 
language leads him to argue that all we have come to 
know can be reduced, upon analysis, to approximately 
six logically autonomous forms (the empirical, mathe­
matical, moral, religious, aesthetic, and the socio­
logical/historical) . Each form is mediated by certain 
categories that change only under the influence of 
Kunian paradigm shifts, and it is from these categories 
that the substantive concepts which we use and change 
(and teach) can be derived. 
Understood along these lines, the structure of 
knowledge has very definite logical implications for 
constructing a curriculum, as Hirst defines one. It 
does not provide us with specific syllabi or particular 
teaching strategies, as there is no one-to-one relation­
ship presumed between the logical features of a 
"language game", and the psychological situation of 
the child. The Herbartians would agree, and go on to 
say that the artful reconstruction of this relationship 
is part of our task, and signifies what they might have 
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regarded as a special kind of interpretative knowledge — 
actual correlation or concentration. However, for 
Hirst, the "rules of the game" are to dictate to others 
(Hirst speaks most often of "empirical psychologists" 
and "manpower specialists") the parameters within which 
they are to organize the curriculum. The knowledge 
base is presumed objective as it can be rendered trans­
parent by the specially trained analytic philosophers. 
One imagines a sophisticated new knowledge-delivery 
system, creating several new steps along "the ladder 
of knowledge", with the analytically trained 
administrators boasting to a grateful television 
audience of their success in delivering knowledge more 
efficiently than the bureaucrats across the street 
deliver health care or welfare. The new day will dawn 
once we cleanse the teachers' minds of "crazy fuzzy 
thinking", and the theorist can turn the realm of 
practice over to the psychologists and the manpower 
specialists secure in "the knowledge" that there really 
isn't much of consequence for them to muck about with. 
And what will they be doing? Outside the Platonic 
cave, there would stand the liberal jig puzzle.23 
The puzzle depicts six complex and distinctively 
designed towers of most intricate construction arising 
out of a common base, with surrounding scenery and sky 
that throws them into high relief. The people split into 
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two approved factions. One group insists that each 
distinct and intricate tower should be constructed first 
and only afterwards should the common base, sky, and 
people walking around be filled in. The second group 
believes they ought to begin with the common base, and 
slowly work up from the bottom to the top, filling in 
each tower and the spheres in between all at the same 
time. 
Both groups could be supported and honored by a 
"Hirstian administration". Only those who feel that the 
puzzle is of such a kind that any variety of pictures 
could be made from it, and proceed to force the pieces 
together according to their own idiosyncratic whims 
would be rejected. Thus, as long as they stay within 
the rules of the game, what these people actually do 
would be none of Hirst's professional business, as it is 
beyond the scope of logical theory. 
I'm not sure how the Herbartians would respond to 
the metaphor of the jigsaw puzzle, as they seemed 
blissfully unaware of it. Upon first glance, it is 
tempting to see the argument between the two approved 
factions as a reenactment of the Herbartian debate 
between concentration and correlation. However, I don't 
think that such a view captures the significance either 
Hirst or the Herbartians. On the one hand, it is clear 
that Hirst's theory of the structure of knowledge is 
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far more sophisticated than anything the Herbartians had 
discovered. And, we may legitimately suppose that 
Dwayne Huebner was correct when he recently observed 
"we are presumably much more informed about the process 
of learning than we have been at any time in our collec­
tive past".^ On the other hand, we must recognize that 
the single integrated intellectual project the Herbartians 
sought has been thwarted by the exigencies of a liberal 
doctrine that separates and mitigates against those who 
seek to integrate, an intention that settles increasingly 
upon control, an its agenda lies more and more in the 
past and not the present, a methodology that subordinates 
the aesthetic appreciation that seeks connections and 
achieves understanding to a praxiology that seeks 
through management to achieve logical, but not actual 
correlation, and a context that makes education and 
schooling increasingly contradictory categories. But 
while we have noted that the spheres of reflection the 
Herbartians pointed towards can still be explored, and 
this is a possible vision of the future of curriculum 
theory, the thrust of my argument is that we are simply 
constrained from achieving the understandings the 
Herbartians sought so long as we retain their taken-for-
granted definition of curriculum content and let the 
liberal doctrine do our work for us. The relations 
McMurray spoke of (and he was right to claim that 
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students do not grasp them, but we are entitled to ask 
"Who has?"r do not situate themselves in a school, any 
more than a hospital, or a church, etc. In truth, the 
phenomenon we seek to understand extends throughout the 
culture, and our opening question ("What do we teach in 
schools? " )hides that significant truth. When we start 
our thinking inside school doors, we literally blind 
ourselves to what is occuring within, between, and among 
us, and constrain ourselves from developing the con­
ceptual power (much less the practical wisdom and 
communicative competence) to influence this institutional 
life form — and we cannot understand it apart from how 
we act and influence it. To reconceptualize curriculum 
content as "what we come up against in life" amounts to 
a commitment to exploring, in our dialogue with ourselves 
and with each other, and in the work that must be done to 
establish, nourish and extend this dialogue" "Ebw we live 
together"; to sharing what we think/believe; to listening 
to the stories others have to tell, and to the world 
that reverberates in-betweeri. It is only in this kind of 
praxis that we can open up the dimensions of curriculum 
content and work to identify and overcome distortions. 
That what defines the problem of education is 
nothing less than the spirit, the direction in which 
everything is moving in a particular time and place, is 
the central theme that has come through for me during 
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the course of this exploration. A quality of relationship 
so utterly concrete that it eludes contemporary habits of 
minding, we express our concern for education in our way 
of being with ourselves and with each other, in the world 
we construct and in the world we witness. 
That these forms of expression are inter-related 
means that the choice between a strategic concern for 
school practice and a theoretical concern for recon-
ceptualizing curriculum content is a false one. The gap 
between conscious purpose and actual circumstance cannot 
be closed by prepackaged technique or Utopian proposal, 
but can be disclosed to reveal a sea of intentionality 
we must cross together. For the field of curriculum 
theorizing, it's now "sink or swim"; as issues become 
redefined, new avenues of relationship emerge that 
must be seized upon if they are not to disappear. 
While it would be folly to expect particular 
strategic proposals for school curricula to generate 
the critical consciousness we seek, efforts which 
address the distortions we have located in liberal 
doctrine, and seek to provide access to the intra-
personal and/or the socio-political dimensions of 
curriculum content deserve more than our critical re­
appraisal; they deserve our support and encouragement. 
However, our understanding of the network through 
which these intentions must travel should restrain us 
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from equating the fate of such proposals with the fate 
of the discipline "curriculum". It is an approach that 
demands failure. It leads us to regard the phenomenon 
that persons come up against in schools as somehow 
unique to that setting, thus misunderstanding the 
phenomenon and schools. It tends to close off from our 
horizon other action contexts from which we have much 
to learn and much to contribute, and provides us with 
a convenient excuse for failing to pursue lines of 
inquiry and action to points of fruition. 
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EPILOGUE 
We have taken the position that curriculum theorizing 
is a field of study that draws its coherence from the 
pattern of contemporary efforts on its behalf, as opposed 
to a specific discipline with its own method and precise 
object. Recognizing this pattern of effort in terms of 
"generating a theoretical base for restructuring 
curriculum content" involves a reconceptualization of 
curriculum content that sheds light upon the fundamental 
structures that must be transformed. 
In so doing, we come up against a potentially 
debilitating duality. The Prologue called attention to 
two views of emancipation. One stresses the potential of 
persons to go beyond where they have been, and while 
the blocks are understood to have socio-political 
implications, they are portrayed in terms of a biographic 
transformation. The other point of view emphasizes the 
structural relations that locate the personal situation, 
and insists that emancipation refers to the transforma­
tion of the ensemble of social relationships. From the 
perspective of "liberal doctrine as curriculum content", 
what we have here are two sides of the same coin; partial 
critiques of liberal doctrine. Singular efforts to 
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transcend the psychological categories of liberal doctrine 
are, in the end, limited by socio-political circumstance, 
while even the most organized, concerted effort to 
restructure the liberal political categories amounts to 
an oppressive deception if it leaves the psychological 
categories intact (e.g., the USSR). 
Our examination of the Herbartians and Hirst indi­
cates that the taken-for-granted conception of curriculum 
content sheds light on neither the biographic nor the 
political limit situations of everyday life, not even in 
schools. This fits rather well with an overwhelmingly 
interpersonal picture of educational practice. It 
reminds us, as teachers, that the situations we come up 
against are almost always taken as interpersonal ones; 
neither the intrapersonal nor the socio-political 
meanings are commonly explored. The institutional life-
form works in both realms simultaneously, destroying at 
the same time the inner integirity of the psyche and the 
outer community of relation. 
We might say then, with I'ariel: 
In short, we can take more account of what is 
repressed within the liberal order and within 
ourselves at every moment. The very process of 
making repressed interests public will constitute 
the alternative beyond liberalism. . . Thus its 
contours are defined not by some blueprint for 
Utopia but by increasingly penetrating pictures 
of both prevailing institutions and our current 
images of them. 
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Yet, it is necessary to conclude with the recognition 
that the process of generating a theoretical base for 
restructuring curriculum content has barely begun. It is 
still impossible to predict what form this theoretical 
base will come to take, to say nothing of its potential 
impact. 
Essentially what this study contributes is a series 
of topics, generated out of the intrapersonal and socio­
political dimensions of "liberal doctrine as curriculum 
content". The topics, and their preliminary exploration, 
provide a healthy avenue for further research into the 
intrapersonal and socio-political potentialities of a 
particular course of study, and to the extent that such 
inquiry reflects back upon its own form, we can expect 
it to move us further down the path of developing an 
adequate theoretical base. 
Even as we look ahead, it seerns clear that the 
relation between personal and political development will 
remain a central theoretical problem. In representing 
this relationship, we must work our way through con­
ceptually distinct intellectual categories and language 
traditions. However, the recognition that all situations 
are simultaneously personal and structural, that these 
dimensions inform and interpenetrate each other, requires 
us to continue the search for ways of talking and acting 
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that honors the significance of both. So long as we are 
willing to judge this work in terms of its emancipatory 
potential, we are sure to develop more powerful, 
challenging insights into the quality of life in America. 
Yet, as contemporary mappings of the field suggest, the 
role of theory in bringing cibout personal and political 
emancipation is neither fixed nor given. And as we 
begin to grasp what is involved in developing and sharing 
a critical, self-hermeneutical frame of reference that 
challenges the limit situations of our common sense 
interpretations, and directs our attention in practical 
as opposed to technical directions, there are also bound 
to be moments of doubt and despair. Let us remember 
that what is at stake may be nothing less than the 
survival of the human spirit. 
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